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Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in swarms, often unnoticed
in their endless procession. Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful.
Some, for all the benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of
followers that deplete trials of fairness
– Roger J. Traynor, Foreword, in The Riddle of Harmless Error,
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970).

ii

ABSTRACT
The United States Constitution had been in existence for almost two hundred years before
the Supreme Court decided that some violations of constitutional rights may be too
insignificant to warrant remedial action. Known as “harmless error,” this statutory
doctrine allows a court to affirm a conviction when a mere technicality or minor defect
did not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. The doctrine aims to promote judicial
efficiency and judgment finality. The Court first applied harmless error to constitutional
violations by shifting the statutory test away from the error’s effect on substantial rights
to its impact on the jury’s verdict. Over time, the test evolved even further, now allowing
a court to disregard the constitutional error when a majority of the justices believe that
the untainted record evidence shows that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. This sacrifice of
individual and institutional constitutional protections at the altar of judicial efficiency and
judgment finality subverts the harmless error doctrine’s purposes and strikes at the core
of America’s founding ideals. In particular, it allows appellate courts to invade the jury’s
constitutional role as the finder of fact and guilt, to sidestep their constitutional role to
review and correct errors and protect the Constitution, and to incentivize government
actors to commit constitutional violations with little-to-no-ramifications. After
conducting a comprehensive review of the harmless error doctrine and its development,
this thesis traces through the many substantive, theoretical, and practical problems with
the doctrine’s current application. It then proposes that the Constitution and the values
that it protects should once again be elevated above the harmless error doctrine’s
pragmatic concerns of judicial efficiency and judgment finality.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The United States Constitution and Bill of Rights had been in existence for almost
two hundred years before the Court, in Chapman v. California, 1 held that “there are some
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless
….” 2 Thereafter, the Court has applied the harmless error doctrine to all but a select few
constitutional violations.3 The doctrine originally was created, however, to prevent mere
technicalities and minutia that did not affect the parties “substantial rights” 4 from
invalidating convictions and requiring unnecessary retrials. 5 Its goals include judicial
efficiency, conviction finality, and pragmatism in reviewing minor trial defects. 6 Perhaps

1

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Unless otherwise noted, this thesis focuses on harmless constitutional error in the
federal direct appeal context. It generally does not discuss non-constitutional errors, state
court proceedings, habeas corpus review, sentencing cases, or convictions based on plea
agreements.
3
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). See also Justin Murray, “A Contextual
Approach to Harmless Error Review,” Harvard Law Review 130, no. 7 (2017): 1793; the
instances of courts finding a constitutional violation not subject to harmless error review
are “exceedingly rare” and, in applying the harmless error test, the courts find the
constitutional violation to be harmless with “remarkable frequency.”
4
See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case,
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record, without regard to errors
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
5
See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939); harmless error is “to prevent
matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and the formalities and minutiae of
procedure from touching the merits of a verdict;” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S.
607, 614-15 (1946); “‘technical errors’” or “[d]eviations from formal correctness do not
touch the substance of the standards by which guilt is determined in our courts.”
6
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., “A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early TwentiethCentury Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule,” Marquette Law Review 93, no. 2
(2009): 455-56; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., “Harmless Constitutional Error and the
Institutional Role of the Jury,” Fordham Law Review 76, no. 4 (2008): 2060-65; Steven
H. Goldberg, “Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief,” The Journal of Criminal
Law & Criminology 71, no. 4 (1980): 440-41; Charles S. Chapel, “The Irony of Harmless
2

1

that is why, despite its creation in 1919, half-a-decade elapsed before the Court even
considered extending the doctrine to constitutional violations in criminal cases. 7
America’s founding fathers likely would have challenged the Supreme Court
justices to a duel had they attempted to invoke a harmless error doctrine to disregard
constitutional rights in 1791. 8 The harmless error doctrine stands in stark contrast to the
Constitution’s “broader ethical vision” 9 to protect both individual rights and larger
institutional concerns. Thus, for example, the Constitution espouses broad ideals of
individual autonomy and dignity by resting primary power with the people, 10 limiting and
separating the powers of the government, 11 and protecting against unfair and abusive

Error,” Oklahoma Law Review 51 (1998): 515; William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner, “Harmless Error,” Journal of Legal Studies 30, no.1 (2001): 181; Helen A.
Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals,”
Texas Wesleyan Law Review 17 (2011): 396-400.
7
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); “If, when all is said and done,
the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, … the verdict … should
stand, except perhaps when the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific
command of Congress.”
8
As demonstrated by the Burr-Hamilton duel in 1804, the founding fathers were not
afraid to take up arms.
9
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1795. See also Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton,
“Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” Columbia Law Review 88, no. 1 (1988): 94;
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516, 532-33; Gregory Mitchell, “Against
Overwhelming Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review,” California
Law Review 82, no. 5 (1994): 1366; Vilija Bilaisis, “Harmless Error: Abettor of
Courtroom Misconduct,” The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 74, no. 2 (1983):
457-58; Harry T. Edwards, “To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should
Legal Error Be Tolerated?” New York University Law Review 80, no. 6 (1995): 1194-95;
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432-33; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional
Error,” 2052-54.
10
Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516,
533; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432.
11
See U.S. Const. arts. I, II, III. See also U.S. Const. art. V; providing the process
whereby the people retain control over any amendments to the Constitution.
2

government actors and majoritarian control. 12 The Constitution also cements the right to
a public trial before an impartial jury of one’s peers 13 to ensure not only individual
fairness, but also the expression of community values, education of the public, and
transparency and confidence in the criminal justice system. 14 Under the guise of
streamlining the judicial process and affirming convictions of defendants that appellate
judges believe to be guilty, harmless error has eroded principles that are fundamental to
American democracy. 15
Justice Benjamin Cardozo “long ago noted ‘[t]he tendency of a principle to
expand itself to the limit of its logic.’” 16 As scholars have opined, the harmless error
doctrine has exceeded its logic 17 and become the “beast that swallowed the
Constitution.”18 In today’s criminal justice system, enforcement of constitutional rights in

12

U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV. See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,”
457-58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,”
432; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 533; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional
Error,” 2053-56; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1356.
13
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
14
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13, 1821; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom
Misconduct,” 457-58; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-56; Mitchell,
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1355-56; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless
Error,” 536-39; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-96; Daniel Epps, “Harmless Errors
and Substantial Rights,” Harvard Law Review 131, no. 8 (2018): 2178-80.
15
See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2151; “There is something unquestionably troubling
about providing no remedy … for a recognized violation of a right important enough to
be enumerated in our nation’s founding charter …;” Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional
Error,” 2027; Efficiency and finality concerns are diluting constitutional guarantees.
16
Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1173; quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921): 51. See also Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 426.
17
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2027; the harmless error doctrine “has
exceeded the scope of the initial compromise” and we are “approaching a “‘point of no
return.’”
18
Martha Davis, “Harmless Error in Federal Criminal and Habeas Jurisprudence: The
Beast that Swallowed the Constitution,” Thurgood Marshall Law Review 25 (1999): 45.
3

the face of a violation has become the exception rather than the rule. 19 In many cases, the
error is disregarded entirely simply because a small panel of appellate judges believes
that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. 20 Paradoxically, a rule designed to preclude
defendants from using slight errors to obtain indefinite and unnecessary retrials has
become a tool for courts, prosecutors, and police to transgress and trade constitutional
rights for convictions in cases involving life and liberty. 21
Consider the following case, which is riddled with injustice and misconduct:
Kirk Defendant was tried in 1985 along with his alleged accomplice, Tim
Defendant, for the 1984 robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree murder of Donna Hare.
The prosecution’s case consisted of a confession by Tim, a later confession by Kirk, and
witnesses that placed Tim at or near the convenience store at which Hare worked and
from which she was taken. Tim’s confession occurred after more than eleven hours of
interrogation over two separate sessions, in between which Tim had a “dream” that led to
his confession story. In it, he implicated Kirk and a third person, Odie, stating they
robbed the store, abducted Hare, and took her to an area behind a power plant where she

See also Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 421; the doctrine is a “constitutional
sneak thief.”
19
See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427; The harmless error doctrine has no
“substantive doctrinal base.” It is an “appellate procedural doctrine which has caused
‘mischief’ beyond anyone’s expectations.” (Citation omitted).
20
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also Mitchell, “Against
Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1354-56 & n. 112; ibid., 1369; “[T]he Constitution
entitle[s] a criminal defendant to a fair ‘trial by jury,’ not a ‘trial by appellate court;’”
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2056; “The jury provisions … reflect … a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to
a group of judges.”
21
Such control by a small group of judges over the individual rights of Americans is
precisely what the founders sought to prevent by installing protections in the Constitution
and Bill of Rights. See supra n. 20.
4

was raped. They then took her to an abandoned house behind the plant, where Odie, the
alleged ringleader, stabbed her to death, after which the men set fire to her body and the
house, burning it down. After Tim’s confession, Kirk was arrested and, following two
hours of unrecorded discussions with the police during which he insisted he was at a
party all that night, he finally confessed substantially the same story as Tim. Kirk had a
lower-than-average IQ and was suffering post-traumatic stress and guilt relating to his
mother’s accidental death earlier that year. The police told Kirk that Tim had already
confessed and implicated him and Odie, and so Kirk might as well confess, too. Two
days later, Kirk recanted his confession to the police and in letters to his attorney. The
letters, which also contained alibi witness leads, were intercepted by the police.
The confessions turned out to be problematic regarding Odie, and he was
exonerated of any involvement. Before this occurred, however, the prosecution
interrogated Odie three times, during which officers fed him facts about the crimes and
after which they brought him to Kirk’s cell for identification. Kirk’s description of Odie
in his confession did not match Odie and Kirk could not identify Odie when he appeared.
The police also brought some bones to Kirk’s cell to persuade him to reveal the location
of the “rest” of Hare’s body because, despite the confessions, they were unable to locate
any human remains at the burned-up house.
Early in 1986, Hare’s body was discovered more than thirty miles from where
Tim and Kirk said the murder occurred. Her cause of death was not stabbing or burning,
but a single gunshot wound to the head. The owner of the abandoned house also revealed
that he had personally burned the property down in 1983, a year prior to Hare’s

5

abduction. Nonetheless, the prosecution pressed on, even after it received a pretrial ruling
that Tim’s confession was not sufficiently reliable and could not be used in Kirk’s trial.
The men were tried separately. At Kirk’s trial, the prosecution called two
witnesses who allegedly saw Tim and another man departing with Hare from the
convenience store. At the urging of the police, the witnesses testified that the second man
resembled Kirk. In reality, they had described the second man to the police as a 6’2” male
with sandy brown hair. Kirk is 5’9” with dark brown hair. In addition, the prosecution
offered the testimony of an often-used jailhouse informant, who said Kirk confessed all
of the same events to her. Finally, the case investigator took the stand, testified to Kirk’s
confession, and included statements about Tim’s confession, to corroborate Kirk’s.
The jury convicted Kirk. Kirk filed an appeal, and the prosecution argued that any
errors that occurred are harmless. What should the court decide? Does the Constitution
preclude the actions taken by the police and prosecutors and warrant a new trial for Kirk?
Because answering these questions requires a thorough understanding of the Constitution
and the harmless error doctrine, Chapter Two begins by outlining the Constitution’s
framework, guiding principles, and protective rights, and Chapter Three follows with the
origin and expansion of the harmless error doctrine to constitutional violations. Chapter
Four merges the preceding two chapters to demonstrate the constitutional, theoretical,
and practical problems of applying harmless error review to constitutional infractions,
while Chapter Five traces the numerous potential solutions for the conflict between
constitutional rights and the harmless error doctrine proposed by scholars over the
decades. Finally, Chapter Six closes with my view that the time has come for the Court or
Congress to rethink the harmless error doctrine’s application to constitutional rights. The
6

Court’s current jurisprudence has so far deviated from the doctrine’s original intent that it
has disassociated constitutional violations from judicial remedies, 22 despite the Court’s
constitutional obligation to support and defend the Constitution.23 This resulting shift
impacts not only individual constitutional protections but also the core values and
integrity of our constitutional system. When government actors or the courts ignore our
nation’s Constitution and laws, “it breeds contempt for the law; invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” 24

22

See Brandon L. Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law,” Wisconsin Law Review 2005, no. 1 (2005): 57, n. 104; see Murray, “A
Contextual Approach,” 1794; the harmless error rule is the “leading contributor to the
expansive gap between rights and remedies in criminal procedure;” Sam Kamin,
“Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split,” Virginia Law Review 88, no. 1 (2002):
5-6; harmless error “has the capacity to permanently sever rights from remedies.”
23
U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; U.S. Const. art. VI; Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,”
57, n. 104; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510, 517.
24
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct.
1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967), and overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). See also Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom
Misconduct,” 457; “Society and the courts have a significant interest in promoting
confidence in the administration of justice, and in preserving the judicial process from
contamination by courses of action found illegal or deemed unfair.”
7

Chapter Two: Constitutional Framework, Principles, and Rights
The Constitution of the United States was created by and for the People. 25 Indeed,
the Preamble and Article XII serve as the Constitution’s bookends, establishing thereby
that it was created by “We the People” and projecting “the message of popular
sovereignty.” 26 The Constitution’s original structure, as drafted by the people’s
representatives at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, aimed to ensure “life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness” for all people in reaction to the historical abuses of power
by English monarchs as well as anti-majoritarian sentiments. 27 The founders believed that
a divided government best prevented an “accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,” which they
deemed “the very definition of tyranny.” 28 In order to further constrain the ability of a
majority in one branch from reducing the people’s influence, however, the founders also
reasoned that this partition “did not mean that these departments ought to have no
PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other.” 29 Thus, the
Constitution, in its Articles, establishes fundamental protections of the people’s power

25

U.S. Const. pmbl.; “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.”
26
See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random
House, 2005), 29.
27
See The Declaration of Independence, ¶ 2.
28
See The Federalist Papers, No. 47.
29
Ibid. (Emphasis original).
8

through the separation of governmental powers and a system of checks and balances
between them. 30
Article I ensures that the people directly elect the members of Congress, who, by
that election, then represent the people’s voice in the creation of laws that “provide for
the general Welfare of the United States” and that are “necessary and proper” for carrying
such laws into execution. 31 Congress also possesses many administrative functions, such
as the ability to investigate executive members of government and to define the
jurisdiction of the judiciary, which it may use in checking the other branches. 32 Article II
similarly provides that the State legislatures, which are reflections of the people’s will,
shall appoint representatives to elect the President, who is then responsible for enforcing
the laws made by the Congress and preserving, protecting, and defending the

30

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926); “The doctrine of the separation of
powers was adopted … not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the government powers among three departments, to save
the people from autocracy.” (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by, Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
The founders drew from and refined the idea of “separation of powers” from John
Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government and Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws.
Locke proposed separating the powers of the executive and legislative branches. See John
Locke and Peter Laslett, “Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the
Common-wealth,” in Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 130-31. Montesquieu expanded upon Locke, adding the third judiciary
branch. Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, “Of the Laws Which
Establish Political Liberty, with Regard to the Constitution,” in The Complete Works of
M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1, 197-239.
31
U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8. The Congress’ powers include the passage of federal laws,
establishment of federal courts below the United States Supreme Court, ability to
override a presidential veto of a proposed law, and ability to impeach the president. See
Ibid., §§ 1-10.
32
Ibid., §§ 1-10.
9

Constitution. 33 This enforcement power is reserved to the executive branch, meaning that
the president can refuse to execute orders from the Supreme Court, 34 and also is entitled
to veto laws coming from Congress, absent a two-thirds majority vote in both houses. 35
Finally, Article III assigns to the people’s senatorial representatives the authority to
confirm the president’s nomination of federal judges, whose judicial power then extends
to all cases arising under the Constitution and Laws of the United States, with a specific
duty to support the Constitution. 36 The Supreme Court holds the largest check on the
other branches through judicial review, which allows it to determine whether a legislative
or executive action violates any preexisting law and, if so, rule that it is
unconstitutional. 37
In addition to the rights and protections implicit in the Constitution, certain
founders sought to enumerate specific fundamental rights within a Bill of Rights.
Founder Alexander Hamilton opposed this movement, believing that a bill of rights was
both unnecessary and dangerous. In Hamilton’s view, the Constitution, by its structure
and design, already protects fundamental individual liberties. For example, to prevent
governmental abuse, the people, through their congressional representatives, possess the

33

U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3. The President’s powers include the power to veto a
proposed law, appoint federal judges and officials, make treaties, ensure that all laws are
followed, issue pardons, and act as Commander in Chief. See Ibid., §§ 1-4.
34
See, e.g., Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); President Jackson refused to
execute the Supreme Court’s order of this case.
35
U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1-4.
36
U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; U.S. Const. art. VI. The Judiciary’s powers include the
power to try federal cases and controversies, interpret the Constitution, and declare a law
or executive act unconstitutional. See Ibid.
37
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; U.S. Const. art. VI. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803).
10

power of impeachment; the Constitution prohibits titles of nobility; all trials for crimes
shall be by a jury of peers; and the Constitution allows speech in the form of political
dissent without fear of being deemed treasonous. Hamilton added that a Constitution “by
the people” necessarily means that the government possesses only those powers expressly
granted to it and that all other powers remain with the people. A bill of rights would
transgress this principle in two ways: first, express articulation of certain rights might
imply that other, unmentioned individual rights are excluded from the Constitution and,
second, limitations placed on certain government powers would suggest that the
government’s powers otherwise are plenary and not limited by the Constitution. In
essence, it would give the government powers it did not originally possess and limit the
people’s rights when the Constitution imposed no such limits.38 Of course, the Bill of
Rights ultimately was ratified in 1791, although Amendments IX and X do appear to
address Hamilton’s concerns. Amendment IX clarifies that the enumeration of certain
rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” 39 and
Amendment X reinforces that “powers not delegated to the United States” are “reserved
… to the people.” 40
Thus, any assessment of the Constitution and Bill of Rights must begin with the
understanding that the government does not confer individual rights and liberties on the
people but, instead, it exists to protect and uphold the rights people possess inherently by

38

See The Federalist Papers, No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton, co-authored with James
Madison and John Jay).
39
U.S. Const. amend. IX.
40
U.S. Const. amend. X.
11

virtue of being human beings. 41 The question becomes, what rights did the founders
believe to be so significant that they expressly reinforced them in the amendments to the
Constitution? Most relevant for purposes of this thesis dealing with harmless error are the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and, by extension, the later addition of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 42 The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures, 43 and guards an individual’s privacy interest, deters
abusive police conduct violating this right, and results in exclusion of unlawfully
obtained evidence at trial. 44 The Fifth, Six, and Fourteenth Amendments elaborate
specific guarantees to ensure a fair trial. The Fifth Amendment prohibits charges without
indictment by a grand jury based on probable cause, being placed in jeopardy for the
same offense twice, being compelled to incriminate one’s self, and deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. 45 This provision of due process is
furthered by the Fourteenth Amendment, which adds the right to equal protection of the
laws to prevent bias, prejudice, and discrimination. 46 And the Sixth Amendment
elaborates on trial rights, namely to know the nature and cause of the criminal charge
pressed, to confront and compel witnesses and have assistance of counsel in presenting a

41

Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 509.
While the Eighth Amendment also has bearing, it is not discussed in this thesis.
43
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
44
See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1197-98;
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defense, and to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of peers. 47 These
amendments outline “the minimal parameters” for the jury trial that is required by Article
3, § 2 48 for a fair criminal proceeding. 49
Notably, many of these provisions extend beyond protections for criminal
defendants to larger societal and institutional concerns, particularly in terms of the jury’s
role as the voice of the community and its ability to reach a just conclusion in the context
of a procedurally fair trial. 50 For example, from the individual defendant’s perspective,
the amendments ensure jury consideration of reliable and uncoerced evidence in an
unbiased trial wherein the defendant is enabled to marshal contrary evidence with
attorney assistance. From a broader perspective, the jury encompasses the “by the
people” anchor of the Constitution. Just as the ballot serves as a mechanism for the
people to decide who will represent them in both the executive and legislative branches,
the jury acts as a means for the people to influence and oversee the judicial branch, which
includes that branch’s review of executive and legislative decisions. 51 The jury possesses
the power to object to a law of Congress or a prosecutor’s application of such law
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49
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510.
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Contextual Approach,” 1812-22; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-98; Epps,
“Harmless Errors,” 2178-80.
51
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2053; Amar, America’s Constitution, 237,
239, 229-30; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); “Providing an accused
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.”
48
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through the use of jury nullification and the introduction of mercy in their deliberations. 52
Because of these interests and the importance of the jury’s function as the bulwark
against tyranny in our democracy, 53 which Hamilton described as “a valuable safeguard
to liberty … [and] the very palladium of free government,” 54 the Constitution’s right to
trial by jury must remain paramount in all considerations of judicial fairness. As the Fifth
Amendment broadly states, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without first receiving due process of law. And due process, in turn, reflects the
participatory role of the community through the jury and, thereby, ensures the
community’s confidence in the legitimacy and reliability of the judicial process and
safeguards provided by our democratic government. 55
Articles III and VI state that it is the role of the federal courts to support the
Constitution.56 While the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall be the
appellate court, it also grants the legislative branch the power to create inferior federal
courts, such as the trial courts in which the juries operate and the intermediary appellate
courts of review. 57 Indeed, the existence of a trial court is implicitly presumed, as without
a trial court the jury would have no venue, and the Supreme Court would have no
appellate purpose. It must be borne in mind, however, that the Constitution and its
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amendments require a jury to act as the arbiter of guilt and justice after a fair trial. 58
Thus, distinctions must be drawn between proceedings in trial courts and appellate courts
to understand their proper roles within the larger justice system.
A. The Roles of the Courts
Trial courts serve multiple purposes. They provide the public forum for juries to
make the legal determination to convict or acquit based on findings of fact, for judges or
juries to impose punishment upon guilty lawbreakers, and for public venting of disputes
that impact the public interest and public policy. The United States criminal justice
system is an accusatory one, but also one which presumes innocence unless the
government proves every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. A
court must inform a jury of the crime’s legal elements and provide a public forum in
which it can assess the facts to reach a conclusion of legal guilt or innocence. 59 Thus, the
Supreme Court has condemned the deprivation of life, liberty, or property in secret 60 and
enforced the Sixth Amendment right to a public jury trial, which ensures community
discourse and oversight in regard to law and accountability, as well as fair and
trustworthy criminal proceedings for defendants. 61

58
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U.S. Const. amend XIII.
60
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In contrast, appellate courts do not provide the public forum for determination of
guilt and fact-finding, but act to defend the fairness and sanctity of the trial forum by
identifying and reviewing errors presented there, fixing those errors when found, and
clarifying the law to steer the course so that the same errors may be avoided in the
future. 62 Errors come in different shapes and sizes. They may involve trial court
discretionary rulings, such as the exclusion or admission of evidence, which is reviewed
for abuse of discretion, factual determinations, such as a jury’s verdict, which is reviewed
for clear error, 63 or applications of the law, such as statements made in jury instructions,
which are reviewed de novo. 64 When an error was objected to at trial and is raised on
appeal, the appellate court should correct it, absent harmless error. 65 Regarding
clarification of the law, appellate courts fulfill this role by the issuance of written legal
opinions, which, in conjunction with stare decisis, 66 provide stability to the law and allow
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the public, attorneys, and courts to regulate their future behavior. 67 Ultimately, however,
both trial and appeal courts must aim to preserve and protect the Constitution. Violations
of constitutional rights, if allowed to go uncorrected, fail the individual whose protections
are transgressed, fail the institutional democratic ideals promoted by those protections,
and fail to deter government officials such as police and prosecutors from committing
abuses, thereby diluting protections against government abuse and tyranny.
B. The Role of Prosecutors
Prosecutors within the executive branch also play a critical role in ensuring that
constitutional rights are protected. Indeed, it has been stated that prosecutors have “more
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.” 68 The
Constitution in Article VI and Congress by legislation thus both require that upon taking
the oath of office, prosecutors must swear to “support and defend the Constitution” and
“bear truth faith and allegiance” to it. 69 Almost a century ago, the judicial branch
reinforced this mandate by more fully articulating the special responsibilities of the
prosecutor in the American system of justice:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
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Company, 2006), 5-9.
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See Robert H. Jackson, “The Federal Prosecutor,” in American Institute of Criminal
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justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one. 70
As the Court has stated, and numerous commentators have explained, 71 American
prosecutors occupy a unique position of serving in the dual role of “advocate” and “seeker
of justice.” On the one hand, “[t]hey are assigned the task of arguing for conviction” and,
on the other hand, they “have special professional obligations to ensure that the system of
criminal adjudication is just and procedurally fair [by] … enforcing the law [and] …
interpret[ing] and apply[ing] the Constitution in good faith.” 72 Juries depend on
prosecutors fulfilling both of these roles, and juries assume that prosecutors will uphold,
and not violate, constitutional rights. 73 Thus, criminal defendants whose rights are
transgressed suffer a multi-leveled harm; not only are their rights violated, but they are
prejudiced by the jury’s assumption that no violation could have occurred. Prosecutors are
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72
Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 239-40; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak
Thief,” 438-39.
73
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88-89.
71

18

stamped with the imprimatur of rightfully seeking guilt within the framework of a trial that
is assumed to be fair and just.
The duty of prosecutors to put justice before convictions does not always reflect
reality, however, because prosecutors are not always adept at balancing their dual roles
and because their personal futures often are at odds with this delicate balance. First, their
role as advocate is premised on the Anglo-American-based “invisible hand” theory that
by pitting two sides against each other, one side seeking conviction and the other side
seeking acquittal, the resulting outcome will reflect a well-vetted, accurate, and just jury
decision. 74 By contrast, their role as “ministers of justice” originates from the European
civilian inquisitorial tradition of a single prosecutor fairly and even-handedly presenting
all evidence, both favorable and unfavorable, to a single judge in the pursuit of a just
verdict. 75 This combination of adversarial and inquisitorial roles necessarily creates
conflict for American prosecutors. The former places the prosecutor in the role of a
gladiator in a contest, while the latter places the prosecutor in a role akin to “second
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judge” in a neutral proceeding. 76 Noting this tension, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
elevated the prosecutor’s truth-seeking function over it advocacy function, stating that
“the adversary system of prosecution [must not] descend to a gladiatorial level
unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth.” 77 Policing themselves,
lawyers have recommended a similar, albeit, nonbinding provision. American Bar
Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8, comment 1, explicitly states that
while serving as both an advocate and a minister of justice, a prosecutor has “specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided
upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that specific precautions are taken to prevent
and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.” 78
The Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual provides similar
institutional guidelines, and the States’ ethical rules and disciplinary procedures bind
prosecutors practicing within their jurisdictions. 79 The Manual expressly states that its
provisions are not judicially enforceable by private parties, but the Justice Department’s
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Office of the Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility are empowered
to investigate prosecutorial violations internally. 80 State codes of professional conduct are
enforceable based on a complaint by a private party or a judge, and the resulting State
disciplinary proceedings may lead to several different types of sanctions against an
attorney, including a prosecutor. 81 Comparison of State laws shows that all 50 States have
adopted ABA Model Rule 3.8, entitled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.” 82
Together, State-law versions of ABA Model Rule 3.8 and the United States
Attorneys’ Manual impose on prosecutors a series of professional obligations, many of
which are designed to protect the constitutional criminal procedural rights that appear in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ABA Model Rule 3.8, as
complemented by the United States Attorney’s Manuel and other behavioral guides for
prosecutors, requires that prosecutors shall:
(a) refrain from indicting a charge without adequate evidence that that the
defendant committed the crime, 83 which supports the Fifth Amendment right to a proper
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grand jury indictment and due process, 84 and the Fourteenth Amendment right not to be
targeted in violation of equal protection. 85
(b)-(c) not seek a waiver of an unrepresented defendant’s pretrial rights, but,
instead, ensure that the defendant has been advised of the right to counsel, how to get
one, and given a reasonable opportunity to obtain one, 86 all of which support the Sixth
Amendment. 87
(d), (g-h) make timely disclosure to the defense of all exculpatory, impeachment,
or other evidence or information tending to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the
offense, as well as any new such evidence that may later come to light, and even seeking
release for a wrongful conviction, 88 all of which implicates numerous due process
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constitutional protections relating to the lawfulness of and ability to address evidence and
witnesses under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 89
All of the above binding State codes of professional conduct and the Department
of Justice’s professional guidance manuals serve as extrajudicial tools to ensure
constitutional prosecutorial behavior. Or, at least, this premise is true in theory.
Numerous commentators have noted that the States and Justice Department are reluctant
to hold prosecutors accountable for ethical, even constitutional, violations.90 Moreover,
as mentioned earlier, a second unfortunate reality is that prosecutors have personal
reasons for placing obtaining convictions over seeking justice. A prosecutor’s position,
promotions, and non-governmental career aspirations may depend on maintaining a high
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rate of convictions. 91 Prosecutors also face bureaucratic and professional pressures to
convict, especially if they are elected officials. 92 All of these factors disincentivize
prosecutors from making concessions, based on constitutional rights, that might lower
their chances of winning. The courts’ willingness to invoke the doctrine of harmless error
to affirm convictions, despite constitutional errors, exacerbates the conflict presented by
the prosecutor’s dual role as advocate and seeker of justice by encouraging prosecutors to
subordinate respect for the Constitution to the desire to convict. Prosecutors, knowing
that the harmless error doctrine will likely neuter many of their errors, may ignore their
oath to support the law and Constitution, opting, instead, to elevate convictions and
personal interests over justice.
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Alex Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” Georgetown Law Journal Annual Criminal Law
Review 44 (2015): xxvi, xxxviii; Following the release of an innocent man a prosecutor
had wrongfully convicted 30 years earlier, the prosecutor, tellingly, apologized:
In 1984, I was 33 years old. I was arrogant, judgmental, narcissistic and
very full of myself. I was not as interested in justice as I was in winning.
To borrow a phrase from Al Pacino in the movie “And Justice for All,”
“Winning became everything.”
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Chapter Three: Harmless Error Then and Now
The Constitution’s structure and protection of individual rights support and
defend the ideal of a fair criminal trial. To understand why the doctrine of harmless
constitutional error poses a significant danger to this structure and these rights, the
harmless error doctrine’s origin and evolution must be traced.
A. The Original Purpose and Evolution of Harmless Error Review
Despite the Constitution’s creation in 1789, the concept of harmless constitutional
error did not emerge in American law until almost two hundred years later. It evolved
from the English system, despite significant differences existing between the two systems
that, arguably, make harmless error analysis suitable for England, but destructive for the
United States. 93 American appeals proceed on the record created in the trial court and the
parties briefing regarding alleged errors that were either preserved by objection in the
trial court or are “plain,” 94 with no additional testimony or evidence given on appeal and,
frequently, the absence of oral argument. The appellate judges assess the record and
render a written decision, and if the decision is to reverse a conviction, the result is a
remand to the trial court for a new trial. 95 By contrast, English appeals are first screened
by a single judge, who either grants or denies permission to appeal. If permission to
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appeal is granted, the judges proceed on a very different record. The record from the trial
court is more limited, the parties do not file briefs, and oral argument, at which the parties
may present new testimony and evidence and raise new errors, plays a significant role. 96
As a general rule, English appellate courts issue an oral decision either dismissing the
appeal as meritless or allowing it and reversing the conviction or reducing the sentence,
usually without a remand for a new trial. 97 Notably, the standard applied in English
appeals is the accuracy of the verdict, whereas, in American appeals, appellate courts are
bound to protect and preserve the constitutional criminal procedural rights contained in
the written Constitution.98 “The English concept of a fair trial thus requires only that the
accused be proven guilty. The American concept of a fair trial requires much more,” and
these “fundamental differences” should influence differential application of the harmless
error doctrine in the two systems. 99
Despite these differences, the harmless error doctrine developed in the United
States much like it did in England. 100 In England, appellate courts initially used harmless
error review in the early nineteenth century to affirm convictions if sufficient evidence
existed, independent of the error. 101 Over time, however, judges began to believe that this
broad harmless error rule violated defendants’ rights, provided inadequate remedies, and
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caused the rules of evidence to be less carefully considered by the courts. 102 Thus, in the
mid-1830s, a stricter form of review arose called the “Exchequer Rule.” 103 The rule
stated that “a trial error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused
prejudice” and, therefore, required conviction reversal. 104 While this automatic reversal
rule was intended to protect people’s rights from violations that occurred in their previous
trials, it also, unintentionally, resulted in overly-strict application of the standard, wherein
judges would reverse convictions based on any technical error. 105 By the mid-nineteenth
century, the standard became so ingrained in English common law that most trial errors
found on appellate review resulted in automatic reversal. Not until decades later did
Parliament enact the Judicature Act of 1873, which implemented a harmless error rule for
civil disagreements, 106 and, even later, in 1907, a harmless error rule for criminal cases
through the Criminal Appeal Act. 107 These Acts were slow to accomplish their intended
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goals because appellate judges hesitated to apply harmless error to affirm verdicts that
rested on errors. 108 Ultimately, however, the English harmless error rule did prevail. 109
Meanwhile, in America, the Exchequer Rule borrowed from England continued to
hold sway through the nineteenth century. 110 By the early twentieth century, however, it
became noticeable that appellate judges were reversing criminal convictions based on
minor errors of form or procedure. 111 Commentators labeled the appellate courts
“impregnable citadels of technicality.” 112 In one infamous example, mere omission of the
word “the” before “peace and dignity” in an indictment resulted in reversal, after which a
continued cumulation of minor errors resulted in the case being tried-reversed-and retried
four times before reaching conclusion. 113 Defense lawyers became known for placing
errors in the record, resting easy in the knowledge that even minor errors would overturn
a conviction and give them a second chance at acquittal. 114 Public and professional outcry
resulted in a coalition that pressed for remedial legislation. Spearheaded by the American
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Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1174.
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record.’” (Citation omitted).
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Law Institute and the American Bar Association, legal intellectuals such as Roscoe
Pound, John Henry Wigmore, Felix Frankfurter, and William Howard Taft 115 proposed
adoption of a harmless error law which, in 1919, was enacted as an amendment to the
Judicial Code. Act 269 provided: “On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error,
or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after
an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors,
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 116
Reformers hoped the provision would improve judicial efficiency and enhance public
confidence in the criminal justice system. 117
Act 269 later was repealed and replaced by two provisions, 118 Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(a), to govern proceedings at the trial court level, and 28 U.S.C. §
2111, to govern review on appeal. Created by the Supreme Court in 1946 under the
authority granted to it by Congress to promulgate rules of criminal procedure, 119 Rule
52(a) states: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial
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rights must be disregarded.” 120 Enacted by Congress in 1949, § 2111 provides: “On the
hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after
an examination of the record, without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.” 121
The early cases to discuss the harmless error rule and its relationship to
substantial rights did so in the context of non-constitutional errors, and while prior-legal
reformers, Felix Frankfurter and William Howard Taft served as Justices. These Justices
knew and articulated in their opinions both the harmless error rule’s purposes and its
limitations: “to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and the
formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict.” 122 Justice
Frankfurter, citing Chief Justice Taft, further explained, “[t]he ‘technical errors’ against
which Congress protected jury verdicts are of the kind which led some judges to trivialize
law by giving all legal prescriptions equal potency. Deviations from formal correctness
do not touch the substance of the standards by which guilt is determined in our courts,
and it is these that Congress rendered harmless.” 123

120
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Bruno, 308 U.S. at 294 (1939) (Frankfurter, J, writing for a virtually unanimous court,
with Reynolds, J., concurring only in the result).
123
See Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15 (1946) (Frankfurter, J); William Howard Taft,
“Administration of Criminal Law,” Yale Law Journal 15, no. 1 (1905): 15. See also
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927); Chief Justice Taft writing for the Court, of
which Frankfurter was a member, and rejecting the government’s argument that “the
evidence shows clearly that the defendant is guilty … and therefore that he cannot
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Yet, the statutory term “substantial rights” remained a vague one. In Kotteakos v.
United States, 124 and Bollenbach v. United States, 125 the Court clarified the term’s
meaning, the proper application of harmless error, and its limitations in relation to jury
determinations. First, the Court explained that appellate judges are not to decide cases as
if they are the jurors:
[I]t is not the appellate court’s function to determine guilt or innocence.
Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to
how the speculation comes out. … Those judgments are exclusively for
the jury ….
[T]he question is, not were [the jurors] right in their judgment, regardless
of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error
had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision. The
crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other
men, not one’s own, in the total setting. 126 [It] … is not whether guilt may
be spelt out of a record, 127 but whether guilt has been found by a jury
according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials in
the federal courts. 128
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Next, the Court explained the harmless error test as one assessing the impact of the error:
If, when all is said and done, the [court’s] conviction is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand, except perhaps when the departure is from a
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress.
But, if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to
conclude that substantial rights were not affected.” 129
Finally, the Court warned against too broad of an application of the harmless error rule:
From presuming too often all errors to be 'prejudicial,' the judicial
pendulum need not swing to presuming all errors to be 'harmless' if only
the appellate court is left without doubt that one who claims its corrective
process is, after all, guilty. In view of the place of importance that trial by
jury has in our Bill of Rights, it is not to be supposed that Congress
intended to substitute the belief of appellate judges in the guilt of an
accused, however, justifiably engendered by the dead record, for
ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial guidance,
however cumbersome that process may be. 130
In Bollenbach, the Court found that a trial judge’s erroneous answer to a jury
question about what was sufficient evidence to convict was harmful, stating “we cannot
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Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65. (Citations omitted).
Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15. (Emphasis supplied).
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treat the manifest misdirection in the circumstances of this case as one of those ‘technical
errors’ which ‘do not affect the substantial rights of the parties …’” 131 In Kotteakos, the
Court held that a variance between an indictment charging one conspiracy and proof that
established only “separate and distinct offenses” to be harmful, stating “our government
is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen, in his
being afforded our historic [sic] individual protections, including those surrounding
criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or complacent ….” 132
B. Application of Harmless Error Review to Constitutional Rights
For many decades, it seemed inconceivable that the harmless error rule would be
applied to constitutional errors. 133 Afterall, a constitutional error could not be viewed as a
“mere technicality,” and the Court had demonstrated its desire to be protective of
individual rights in criminal trials. 134 In 1963, however, the Court flirted with the
possibility that harmless error might apply to constitutional violations in Fahy v.
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Connecticut. 135 There, although an illegal search and seizure occurred in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and although Mapp v. Ohio 136 had held that evidence obtained this
way was inadmissible and required reversal, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that
the error was harmless under the State’s harmless error statute. 137 On writ of certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court did not directly answer the question of whether
harmless error applies to federal constitutional violations; instead, it reversed because the
unlawful evidence introduced at Fahy’s trial was prejudicial. 138 In so doing, however, the
Court made a foundational statement: “the question is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” 139
This statement presaged the standard that the Court would adopt when it finally held, in
just a matter of years, that the harmless error doctrine applies to federal constitutional
violations.
That holding came in Chapman v. California. 140 Chapman involved a California
State provision that allowed the prosecutor to comment on the defendants’ failure to
testify at trial. After the trial, but before the appeal, the United States Supreme Court
decided Griffin v. California, 141 which invalidated the California provision, holding that
it violated the Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
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On appeal, the California Supreme Court recognized Griffin and the constitutional
violation, but held the error harmless under its State provision forbidding reversal unless
“the error complained of ha[d] resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” 142 The State court’s
application of this test asked whether, putting aside the error, “overwhelming evidence”
existed in the record to support the defendants’ convictions. 143 The California Supreme
Court held that such evidence did exist and affirmed.
Reversing the California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court first
articulated that federal law applies to violations of the Federal Constitution, 144 and then
rearticulated the purpose of the harmless error rule to “block setting aside convictions for
small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of
the trial.” 145 Next, however, it made a rather shocking statement when juxtaposed against
the reasons for the harmless error rule: “Although our prior cases have indicated that
there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error,” 146 “there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent
with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal

142

People v. Tealer, 404 P.2d 209 (1965), citing Cal. Const. art. VI, § 4.5 (1965).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.
144
Ibid., 22; Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 16; This result was “born of concern that
state courts, if left free to apply their own harmless error standards, would dilute federal
constitutional norms by too easily finding that constitutional errors were not prejudicial,”
quoting Meltzer, “Constitutional Remedies,” 5; ibid., 1-6; explaining that federal law
preempts state law in matters presenting federal constitution questions; ibid.; noting that
in 1891, Congress created a statute granting all federal criminal defendants a right of
appeal, citing Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517; § 5, 2, 5 State 826.
145
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
146
See infra Pt. D; discussing the difference between “structural” errors, which require
automatic reversal, and “trial” errors, which are subject to harmless error review.
143

35

of the conviction.” 147 The Court then fashioned a harmless error test to be applied to
these “unimportant and insignificant” constitutional violations that differed from both
the California test and the federal test applied to non-constitution errors under Kotteakos.
First, the Court rejected the California test that put aside the error and looked for
“overwhelming evidence” of guilt, noting that the federal harmless error statutes focus on
harm to “substantial rights,” not on “miscarriage of justice.” 148 Next, the Court placed the
burden of proving harmlessness on the government because the government is the
beneficiary of the constitutional violation. Finally, opting not to adopt the Kotteakos
standard but, instead, drawing upon its prior statement in Fahy, the Court said that the
Fahy test effectively required the government either “to prove that there was no injury or
to suffer reversal,” and that this test differed little, if at all, from the standard it was
articulating now as the appropriate test for constitutional violations. 149 For federal
constitutional violations, “[the government must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the [constitutional] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict,” 150 and “the
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court must be able to declare a belief that [the constitutional error] was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.” 151 Ultimately, in Chapman, the Court determined that the Griffin
violation was not harmless because the State’s argument and trial court’s instruction
repeatedly urged the jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendants’ silence at trial,
thus turning their right to remain silent into a form of self-incrimination. 152
Many believed that the Chapman harmless error standard closely resembled the
automatic reversal rule and would lead appellate courts to reverse convictions in most
cases presenting constitutional errors. 153 In reality, the opposite occurred. While the test
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under Chapman hinges on the “federal constitutional error [being] … harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt,” 154 it has been “diluted” in its application, even “distorted” beyond its
“contemplation.” 155 Just two years after Chapman, the Court announced its decision in
Harrington v. California,156 which – despite its “special facts” 157 – has served as the
seminal case for applying the “overwhelming evidence” harmless error test to
constitutional errors, even though the Court expressly rejected that test in Chapman.
Dissenting in Harrington, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Marshall called
it as they saw it, stating: “The Court today overrules Chapman v. California.” 158
Meanwhile, the Harrington majority claimed: “We do not depart from Chapman; nor do
we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it.” 159
Such a stark difference of opinion somewhat defies explanation. On the one hand,
the mere fact that the majority and dissent, albeit applying different tests, reached
different outcomes, should itself demonstrate that the constitutional error was not
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“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” At the least, it made proper articulation of the
governing legal test critical to the case outcome. On the other hand, one explanation for
the Court’s split not proposed in scholarly commentary could be that the majority
intended to limit the holding of Harrington to its “special facts.” 160 The majority opinion
is extremely short (barely more than one page) and describes the erroneously admitted
evidence as cumulative of other evidence, including the defendant’s statement. 161 But it is
questionable whether the highest court in the land, which leads the entire federal judiciary
and the decisions of which have a lasting impact on the nation, should decide a case
based simply on its peculiar facts. Under Article 3, § 2, juries are supposed to be the
arbiters of facts and legal guilt or innocence. 162 Further, it is doubtful whether the
Supreme Court would change the legal test if its sole aim was to correct a perceived,
peculiar factual error. 163 Nevertheless, the test applied by the Harrington majority had a
lasting impact on the development of harmless error review of constitutional violations.
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As in Chapman, Harrington presented the Court with the situation of applying a
new constitutional holding to a case decided before it was announced. After the statecourt trial and appellate affirmance of Harrington’s conviction for felony murder, the
United States Supreme Court decided Bruton v. California, 164 which held that, in a joint
trial, a co-defendant’s confession that implicates the defendant may not be admitted
unless the confessing defendant testifies, because to allow otherwise would violate the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. As the majority describes the
Harrington facts: several eyewitnesses placed Harrington at the scene of the crime, as did
Harrington himself; of the three co-defendant confessions admitted, the one co-defendant
who implicated Harrington in the crime testified at trial and was subjected to crossexamination; the other two co-defendants did not testify but were unable to name
Harrington and could only state that the fourth perpetrator was “the white guy;” finally,
the trial judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury that it was to consider each
confession only against the confessor. 165 After outlining these facts, the majority held that
the case against Harrington was “so overwhelming” that the “violation of Bruton was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, unless we adopt the minority view in Chapman []
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that a departure from constitutional procedures should result in an automatic reversal,
regardless of the weight of the evidence.” 166 It further stated, “[o]ur judgment must be
based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the
probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.” 167
As the dissent noted in reaching a contrary result by applying the Chapman
standard, the majority had shifted the legal test. The majority first set up a compelling
factual statement to convince any reasonable reader that the defendant was, in fact, guilty.
It then altered the Chapman test by including review of the untainted record evidence to
look for “overwhelming evidence” of guilt; by importing a “probable impact” standard
rather than one based on “beyond a reasonable doubt;” and by pushing the jurisprudence
farther away from the automatic reversal rule while expanding the potential category of
constitutional errors subject to harmless error review. The dissent astutely recognized that
the majority was not only changing the course of the development of harmless error law
but promoting appellate court usurpation of the jury’s role as finders of fact and legal
guilt. 168 Harmless error in the context of constitutional violations moved from the
“narrowly circumscribed” focus on the error and its harmlessness only in situations where
it “made no contribution to the criminal conviction,” to a focus “away from” the error to
the surrounding record evidence, which Chapman, itself, had disavowed. 169 Moreover,
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the arbiters of this shifted-test would not be jurors, but appellate judges, who, in groups
of three, would be making factual determinations to assess guilt or innocence. 170 In the
dissent’s view, “apply[ing] [sufficiency or substantiality of the evidence] standards as
threshold requirements to the raising of constitutional challenges to criminal convictions
is to shield from attack errors of a most fundamental nature and thus to deprive many
defendants of basic constitutional rights.” 171 Ominously, the dissent also noted the
dilution of constitutional criminal procedural rights: “As a result [of the majority’s shift],
the deterrent effect … on the actions of both police and prosecutors, not to speak of trial
courts, will be significantly undermined.” 172
Following England’s lead, the United States’ conversion to an “overwhelming
evidence” test seemed set. 173 But, as previously noted, the differences between the two
systems made this test appropriate for England, but not necessarily for American. In
England, appellate judges may review new evidence and arguments and reach different
factual conclusions in determining whether a “miscarriage of justice occurred.” 174 In
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test of harmless error. (Emphasis original); But see Provenzano, et al., Advanced
Appellate Advocacy, 34; asserting that only a minority of federal circuit courts use the
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2019.
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America, appellate judges are limited to the trial record and the fact-findings of the jury,
and the statute directs review of the “error’s” impact on “substantial rights,” making
appellate court weighing of the untainted record evidence procedurally and
constitutionally inappropriate. 175 Nonetheless, with rare exceptions, the United States
Supreme Court continued to affirm criminal convictions by applying the Harrington
harmless error test, while paying lip-service to the Chapman standard. 176 Thus, just three
years after Harrington, the Court affirmed convictions in Schneble v. Florida 177 and
Brown v. United States, 178 despite Bruton violations in those cases, and in Milton v.
Wainwright, 179 despite a coerced confession in that case. In Scheble, the Court employed
a “probable impact” standard and, arguably, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
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trial by jury.” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427.
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conviction.” (Emphasis supplied). See Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 57; While
the Warren Court had been protective of “fair trial rights, the Rehnquist Court
assiduously preserved th[e] [Court’s] landmark rulings as a constitutional matter, while
weakening the rights in an indirect way by limiting the remedies for their violation, by
ratcheting the strength of the doctrine of harmless error.”
177
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). Notably, Justice Douglas, who had authored
the majority opinion in Harrington, dissented from the application of Harrington in
Schneble, stating “[t]hat decision was limited to a factual setting in which the defendant
admit[ted] being at the scene, and the improperly admitted statements of the codefendants [were] merely cumulative evidence.” Ibid., 433. Justice Douglas did not
dissent from the companion case of Brown v. United States, infra n. 178 & accompanying
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Harrington.
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After citing Chapman, it stated that it was required to determine the outcome based on
“‘our own reading of the record and [] what seems to us to have been the probable impact
… on the minds of an average jury,’” and it “conclude[d] that the ‘minds of an average
jury’ would not have found the State’s case significantly less persuasive had the [codefendant’s] testimony … been excluded.” 180 In Milton, the Court went even further,
assuming, without deciding, that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, and affirming
the conviction because “the record clearly reveal[ed] that any error in its admission was
harmless,” as the defendant had made three prior confessions. 181 The majority did not
mention that the three prior confessions occurred after an 18-day interrogation, without
counsel, and with the defendant denying guilt for ten days and only cracking after two
detectives tag-team questioned him for eight hours straight. Noting the improper factual
manipulation and review by the majority, the dissent accused the majority of ignoring the
question presented, namely “whether the great constitutional lesson of Powell v.
Alabama 182 [that a defendant has a right to counsel] is to be ignored.” The dissent “would
not [have] ignore[d] it, but would [have] honor[ed] its ‘fundamental postulate . . . ‘that
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Schneble, 405 U.S. at 432. See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 428; “By a
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the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict, into a test which forced the defendant to show that the error was of such
significance that without it the defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict of
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As in Harrington, the dissent in Schneble again objected that “[u]nless the Court
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there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard.’” 183
The power of the harmless error doctrine over constitutional violations became
firmly entrenched. Within ten years, the Supreme Court held that harmless error analysis
is required to be applied, despite the magnitude of the constitutional violation or even
prosecutorial misconduct taking advantage of the violation. Federal courts may not
employ their supervisory power to overturn a conviction, absent a finding of harmful
prejudice to the defendant. 184 The considerations guiding supervisory power –
implementation of a remedy for violation of rights, preservation of judicial integrity in
criminal trials, and deterrence of unlawful conduct – were not sufficient, in the Court’s
view, to justify reversal of a conviction and a retrial. 185 Turning the original, limited
purpose for the harmless error doctrine on its head and prioritizing it as more important
than fundamental constitutional rights, the Court deemed the above interests to be
“[in]significant” “when the error to which [they] are addressed is harmless.” 186 A few
years later, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 187 the Court went even further, stating “the
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defendant.
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central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt
or innocence.” 188 It cited numerous factors that inform whether a conviction should be
reversed under harmless error analysis, including “the importance of the witness’
testimony in the prosecution’s case; whether the testimony was cumulative; the presence
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points; the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” 189 Rather than clarifying harmless error law,
the Court contributed to the confusion by creating yet another test and, seemingly,
rendering the constitutional error merely one of many factors for consideration. 190
C. Harmless Error Review When the Jury Does Not Make a Required Finding
Appellate review, even for harmless error, should depend on having something to
review, and that something should be a finding of the jury in a jury trial. In In re
Winship, 191 the Court recognized that it is the jury’s role to find that the elements of the
charged crime are proved beyond a reasonable doubt and it is the prosecution’s burden to
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. When the defendant exercises
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Constitution does not allow a judge to find

return for testifying against the defendant. The Court remanded the case to the Delaware
Supreme Court to conduct harmless error analysis because the Delaware Supreme Court
had erroneously found the error to be structural. See infra Pt. D.
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189
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“The Harm of Harmless Error,” Virginia Law Review 59, no. 6 (1973): 988; “Chaos
surrounds the standard for appellate review of errors in criminal proceedings.”
191
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that the elements are met or to direct a verdict of guilt. 192 Nevertheless, in Rose v.
Clark, 193 the Court extended harmless error “review” even to cases where the jury had
not made a finding regarding an element of the charged crime. In Rose, the trial court had
shifted the burden of proof for the element of malice by instructing the jury that all
homicides are presumed to be malicious unless the defendant rebuts that presumption. 194
A divided Court held that harmless error review applied and remanded to the State court
to make that determination. In so doing, it expressly turned the harmless error exception
into the general rule, stating that when “a defendant had counsel and was tried by an
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have
occurred are subject to harmless error analysis.” 195 It guided the State court’s decision on
remand by declaring that if the record, as a whole, established guilt, then “the interest of
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jury instruction stating “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts” violates Due Process. The Court left open, however,
the question of whether harmless error review could be applied to such an instruction.
Ibid., 527-28. Later, in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), the Court’s plurality
decision revealed a four-four-one split regarding whether harmless error review applies to
this instruction. Ibid. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall opposed
harmless error review unless the defendant either was acquitted or admitted the element
at issue; Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O’Connor favored harmless error
review, generally; and Justice Stevens believed the issue was not a federal one and should
be left to the State court’s determination.
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fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed.” 196 Concurring in the
judgment only, Justice Stevens objected to the majority’s conversion of Chapman’s
rigorous harmless error exception into the general rule, its sole focus on trial reliability
when the Constitution protects values beyond the “truth-seeking function,” and the
danger of encouraging prosecutors to “subordinate” constitutional rights to their desire to
obtain convictions. 197 Dissenting, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall believed the
erroneous instruction required automatic reversal because the Constitution requires that
the jury make all elemental findings and forbids both trial judges, in the first instance,
and appellate judges, on review, from making those findings for the jury. 198
With the entrance of Justice Antonin Scalia to the Court, harmless error review of
jury non-findings appeared to shift as his viewpoint coincided more closely with the Rose
dissenters, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Thus, when the Court, in Carella
v. California,199 issued a per curiam decision that a jury instruction imposing a state-law
mandatory presumption of intent violated Due Process, these four justices concurred only
in the judgment and outlined a limited application of harmless error in this context. They
explained that such review should not – as was stated in Rose – seek to uncover whether
the record, as a whole, supports conviction. To allow such judicial review would be to
“‘invade[] the fact-finding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the
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Ibid., 578-79, 580 & n.8. Accord Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
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Ibid., 590-95 (dissent); “A trial that was fundamentally unfair … because the jury was
not compelled to perform its constitutionally required role, cannot be rendered
fundamentally fair in retrospect by what amounts to … an appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence.” Ibid., 590.
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jury.’” 200 Only in three instances should an instruction with an unconstitutional
presumption or one that omits or seriously misdescribes an element be deemed harmless:
(1) when the defendant was acquitted of the crime; (2) when the defendant admitted the
crucial element; 201 or (3) “[w]hen the predicate facts relied upon in the instruction, or
other fact necessarily found by the jury, are so closely related to the ultimate fact to be
presumed that no rational jury could find those facts without also finding that ultimate
fact.” 202 When none of these circumstances occur, overwhelming record evidence of guilt
is irrelevant because the jury will not have made a required finding susceptible to review,
and appellate judges are not free to make the finding for it.
A few years later, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 203 the Court reconfirmed the proper
roles of the jury and the appellate court. Again writing, Justice Scalia this time
commanded a unanimous Court in holding that an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction
is not a harmless error because it violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and
Fifth Amendment right to Due Process. As the Court explained, “[t]he [harmless error]
inquiry [under Chapman] … is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” 204 In Sullivan’s case, without
a proper reasonable doubt instruction, there could be no valid jury verdict. And without a
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valid jury verdict, no object existed for review of any kind, harmless or otherwise. 205
“The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt – not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional
error.” 206 An appellate court is not free to “speculate” about what a reasonable jury,
hypothetically, might have decided. If such appellate guesswork occurs, then “the wrong
entity judge[s] the defendant guilty.” 207 The determination of guilt or innocence rests
with the actual jury of the defendant’s case, said the Court, and the consequences of the
denial of that jury determination are “unquantifiable and indeterminate.” 208 Thus, as of
Sullivan, the Court seemed primed to reign in harmless error review and protect the jury’s
“fundamental” role in the “American scheme of justice.” 209
This protection did not last long, however. Six years later, in Neder v. United
States, 210 the Court reverted to the “overwhelming evidence” analysis espoused in Rose v.
Clark 211 even though, in Rose, the Court stated that its analysis would have been different
if, rather than a presumption instruction, it had addressed an instructional error that
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Ibid. “If there being no [valid] jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the
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findings.” Ibid., 281. (Emphasis original).
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Ibid., 281-82.
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“prevent[s] a jury from considering an issue.” 212 The latter scenario is precisely what
occurred in Neder – as did obliteration of the proper roles for the jury and judges in
criminal trials. Even worse, Neder could have been quickly and cleanly affirmed using
one of the three Carella exemptions – omission of an element which the defendant did
not contest. In Neder, the element withheld from the jury and, instead, found to exist by
the trial judge, was the undisputed element of materiality. 213
The majority instead used Neder as a vehicle for reestablishing the Rose test and
extending it to the omission of criminal elements from jury instructions. According to
Sullivan, the failure of the jury to determine a required element of the crime – which the
government was required to prove to it beyond a reasonable doubt – should have
rendered the jury’s verdict invalid and unreviewable. Yet, the Neder majority concluded
that Sullivan presented a unique case where all of the jury findings were vitiated by the
instructional error and that any broader reading of Sullivan did not “square with …
harmless-error cases.” 214 And, rather than using the easily-applicable Carella exemption
for non-instruction of an element that the defendant did not contest, the majority
purposefully rebuffed Carella’s three harmless error rules as both too “restrictive” and
too case-specific.” 215 Instead, if “[i]t [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational
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Ibid., 578-79; “Because a presumption does not remove the issue of intent from the
jury’s consideration, it is distinguishable from other instructional errors that prevent a
jury from considering an issue.” Ibid., 580 & n. 8. Justice Rehnquist also distinguished
errors that do not “remove[] an element of the offense from the jury’s consideration in
Sullivan.” See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 283.
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jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error, then the instructional
omission is harmless. 216
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens objected to the majority’s harmless
error review both analytically and principally, just as he had in Rose. Analytically, he
believed the case fit clearly within the Carella parameters for finding an error harmless.
Principally, he viewed the majority opinion as “[in]sensitive to the importance of
protecting the right to have a jury resolve critical issues.” 217 Justices Scalia, Souter, and
Ginsberg issued a vehement dissent. 218 They noted that, in the Constitution, the people
reserved to themselves, as jurors, the right to determine guilt precisely because of their
distrust of prosecutors and judges. The Constitution does not afford a trial judge the right
to direct a verdict of guilty or an appellate judge the right to scour the record for evidence
of guilt, despite the constitutional error. By resorting back to the Rose test, the majority
missed the distinction between “confirming the jury’s verdict” and “making a judgment
that the jury has never made.” 219 In their view, the majority in Neder ignored their proper
role as appellate judges and created a gateway for “trampl[ing] over the jury’s
function.” 220 It placed judicial expediency over constitutional bedrock, thereby shifting
the democratic foundation: “Whereas Sullivan confined appellate courts to their proper
role of reviewing verdicts, the Court [] put[] the appellate courts in the business of
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reviewing the defendant’s guilt” when the Constitution expressly requires the opposite as
a protection of our liberty.” 221
D. Structural Error: The Few Constitutional Rights that Remain Inviolate
After Neder, the Court has continued to apply harmless error review to an
expanding list of constitutional violations and limited automatic reversal to a small, select
group of errors. 222 In Chapman, the Court had stated that “some constitutional rights [are]
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated a harmless error,” 223 citing
as examples cases involving an impartial trial judge, 224 the denial of the right to counsel
at trial, 225 and the admission of a coerced confession. 226 Other than these three examples,
however, the Court did not offer guidance for determining which constitutional violations
would be shielded from harmless error review. 227 That framework would come twentyfive years later, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 228 where a splintered Court listed sixteen
sample constitutional errors susceptible of harmless error review, 229 added coerced
confessions to that list despite Chapman’s statement to the contrary, and established a
distinction between “trial” errors, to which harmless error applies, and “structural” errors,
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to which it does not apply. 230 According to the Court, “trial” errors “occur[] during the
presentation of the case to the jury, and [] may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the
context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [the] admission was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 231 By contrast, “structural” errors are “defects in
the constitution of the trial mechanism,” whereby “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from
beginning to end is … affected,” because the defect is in “the framework within which
the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” 232 “Structural”
defects, thus, implicate such “basic protections” that their deprivation renders the
criminal trial both an unreliable “vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and
“fundamentally[un]fair.” 233
Dissenting from the application of harmless error review to coerced confessions,
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens argued that the majority distorted
precedent, 234 created a dichotomy that did not work even for undisputed automatic
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I and IV. Ibid. As a result, different majorities of the Court found two things: (1)
Fulminante’s confession was coerced; and (2) harmless error applied, but the admission
of Fulminante’s confession was not harmless. See Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 75-76 &
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reversal errors such as a defective reasonable doubt instruction, 235 and ignored that
harmless error analysis requires consideration of “the nature of the right at issue and the
effect of an error upon the trial.” 236 They believed that admission of a coerced confession
violates Due Process in a way that does not compare with other wrongfully admitted
evidence because, not only is a jury unlikely to ignore it, it is so damaging that a jury
might convict on its basis, alone. 237 The dissent added that coerced confessions mandate
automatic reversal because they may be “untrustworthy” and they “offend an underlying
principle … of our criminal law [] that ours is an accusatorial process.” 238 Allowing the
police or the State to violate the law and wring a confession out of a defendant sacrifices
“human values” and endangers the constitutional precept that no person shall be deprived
of life or liberty without due process. 239 The only point for which the dissenters, joined
by Justice Kennedy, carried the day was in the majority holding that Fulminante’s
coerced confession was not harmless because the State had not demonstrated that the
confession’s admission did not contribute to the guilty verdict. They succeeded in
overcoming the minority’s attempt simply to review the record for “overwhelming
evidence” of guilt, apart from the constitutional error. 240
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Ibid., 291 (dissent); citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 283, and explaining that a defective
reasonable doubt instruction also occurs during trial and, yet, has been held to “distort[]
the very structure of it because it creates the risk that the jury will convict … even if the
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While the majority’s holding in Fulminante has been roundly criticized, 241 today,
the reality is that most constitutional errors fall into the category of “trial” errors subject
to harmless error review. The limited list of errors still deemed to be structural defects,
and subject to automatic reversal, include: (1) deprivation of the right to counsel at
trial; 242 (2) lack of an impartial trial judge; 243 (3) discrimination in the selection of grand
or petit jurors; 244 (4) violation of the right to self-representation at trial, to counsel of
choice at trial, and to exercise autonomy over critical decisions made during trial; 245 (5)
an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction; 246 and (6) denial of the right to a public
trial. 247 In recent years, however, the Court has clarified in ways favorable to defendants
that Fulminante’s assessment of “trial” error versus “structural” defect is not all-
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v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017). On the facts presented in Weaver, the Court
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fundamental trial unfairness. Ibid., 1911. It also did not find an error under Strickland v.
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encompassing. Thus, in Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court rejected as “inflexible” any rule that
“only those errors that always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and
unreliable” are structural, 248 as had been suggested in Fulminante. Instead, recent cases
have stated that the reason a constitutional error is structural varies from error-to-error
and, thus far, the Court has discerned three viable reasons that, either alone or in
combination, can render an error structural: 249 (1) if the error “cause[s] fundamental
unfairness, “either to the defendant in the specific case or by pervasive undermining of
the systemic requirements of a fair and open judicial process,” in which case any State
attempt to prove harmlessness will be futile; 250 (2) if the “effect of the error is too
difficult to measure or ascertain,” in which case any assessment of the error for
harmlessness will be mere speculation; 251 or (3) if the “right at issue is not designed to
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,”
in which case the issue of harm is irrelevant.” 252 These recent Supreme Court decisions
and their broader rationale inspire hope that, in the future, constitutional errors will be
scrutinized more closely to ensure that the purposes for constitutional rights are honored
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and to prevent appellate “review” from reducing these rights to mere exceptions to the
harmless error rule.
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Chapter Four: Erosion of Constitutional Rights and Liberties
Up until now, however, the actual instances of courts finding a structural
constitutional defects remain “exceedingly rare” and, in applying the harmless error test,
they find the constitutional error to be harmless with “remarkable frequency.” 253 The
progression to this point largely reflects the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ manipulation
of the constitutional criminal procedural rights established up to and during the Warren
Court era. 254 “In the case of fair trial rights, the[] … [Burger and] Rehnquist Court[s]
assiduously preserved … landmark rulings [protecting rights] as a constitutional matter,
while weakening the rights in an indirect way by limiting the remedies for their
violation.” 255 The Court did so in two primary ways: (1) by shifting the harmless error
test to one of review for “overwhelming” untainted record evidence of guilt from
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Brandon L. Garrett, “Judging Innocence,” Columbia Law Review 108, no. 1 (2008):
57 (emphasis supplied). See also Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2136, n. 120; “That a
narrower reading of Chapman would prevail is unsurprising given the Court’s right-ward
shift as the Warren Court became the Burger Court and, later, the Rehnquist Court;”
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 503, n. 16; “Although the Burger Court did not
overrule the Warren Court cases, it did effectively gut many of them through the
extension of the harmless error rule;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error,” 79-80; noting the “Burger and … Rehnquist Court’s increasingly
widespread use of … harmless constitutional error” and view that it “presumptively
applies to virtually all types of federal constitutional errors.” And see infra Pt. C;
presenting my argument that such control by a group of nine justices over the individual
rights of Americans is precisely what the founders sought to prevent by installing
protections in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
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Harrington forward; 256 and (2) by limiting the class of structural defects subject to
automatic reversal after Fulminante. 257
A. Invading the Province of the Jury
That appellate courts too easily dismiss constitutional error results, in part, from
their failure to recognize their proper role in our system of justice and their shifting of
constitutional protections away from the defendant and in favor of the prosecution. As a
consequence, rather than serving as the minimally-required rules for a fair criminal trial,
constitutional rights have become the exception to a harmless error procedural doctrine
that was designed to promote efficiency and finality. 258 But criminal jury trials serve
larger purposes for the defendant, including as the forum for (1) the jury to assess the
evidence and make credibility calls in reaching its legal determination of guilt or
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See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1358; By contrast, “[t]he
Chapman test requires an examination of whether the error … possibly affected the
decision of ‘at least one member of the jury.’” (Citation omitted). Saltzburg,” The Harm
of Harmless Error,” 1014; “[B]ecause of the enormous burden of proof placed on the
prosecutor …, a small showing of prejudice should suffice to convince an appellate court
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Two additional forms of limitation have also occurred: (1) dilution of certain
constitutional rights by creating exceptions to their substantive application, such as in the
area of search and seizure; see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); and (2)
embedding a prejudice requirement into the elements of proving the violation of certain
rights, such as with ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to disclose exculpatory
information; see Strickland, 466 U.S. 668; Brady, 373 U.S. 83. Garrett, “Innocence,
Harmless Error,” 57, 62 & n. 137, 129. These additional limitations are not discussed, indepth, in this thesis, but for further information, see Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 5055.
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See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427; The harmless error doctrine has no
“substantive doctrinal base.” It is an “appellate procedural doctrine which has caused
‘mischief’ beyond anyone’s expectations.” (Citation omitted).
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innocence, 259 (2) the community’s expression of values and common-sense through that
jury determination, where the jury is free to engage in jury nullification 260 or extend
mercy, 261 and (3) the public airing of disputes to educate the citizenry and ensure fairness
and integrity in legal proceedings as a whole. 262 A defendant who exercises the jury trial
right expects to be judged by his peers, not by three legally-expert appellate judges who
might be jaded by repeated encounters with convicted defendants. 263 Indeed, in Duncan
v. Louisiana, 264 the Court recognized that the jury trial is a fundamental constitutional
protection “against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.” 265 While later cases have held that the jury need not be made
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Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1356-57; “Substantive laws
may be misguided, sentencing laws may be overly harsh, prosecutions may be selectively
imposed, and judges may be biased. Citizens therefore rely on the common sense and
mercy of a jury, through its nullification power, to keep both laws and government
officials from working injustice.”
261
Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 457; “A criminal conviction is not only
a determination of guilt in fact; it is an establishment of legal guilt following settled
procedural rules that are based on societal notions of fairness and on constitutional
rights.”
262
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 511-14 & n. 74; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming
Appellate Activism,” 1354-56 & nn. 112, 120.
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Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1354-56 & n. 112; ibid.,
1369; “[T]he Constitution entitle[s] a criminal defendant to a fair ‘trial by jury,’ not a
‘trial by appellate court;’” Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2056; “The jury
provisions … reflect … a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over life and liberty of the
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See Duncan, 391 U.S. 145.
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Ibid., 156; see also Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 2050;
under the “overwhelming evidence” harmless error test, “the defendant is protected from
neither.”
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up of twelve people 266 and the verdict need not necessarily be unanimous, 267 the Court
drew the line at anything less than a unanimous six-person jury 268 and established that the
Sixth Amendment requires an impartial jury drawn from “a fair cross section of the
community.” 269 A panel of three appellate judges, who are legal experts, who encounter
now-convicted appellants on a regular basis, and who do not witness the evidentiary case
presentation but nonetheless weigh the factual record, thus falls short of the Court’s own
recognized constitutional requirements. 270
Appellate courts should instead adhere to their appropriate roles, which include
(1) error review and correction, (2) development of the law, and (3) supervision of trial
court proceedings. 271 Because the Constitution reserves to the individual the right to have
a jury assess guilt or innocence and does not confer this authority on the courts, 272
appellate courts overstep their authority and invade the province of the jury when they
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Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979);
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Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430-31; ibid; also noting that the defendant
does not get to conduct voir dire to determine the fairness of the appellate judges or to
present countervailing evidence in response to what the appellate judge might have in his
or her mind; see Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2048-49; the appellate court is
not reviewing to preserve the jury’s findings, but supplementing with non-findings of the
jury; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1340; the “appellate court
[is] reviewing the trial record to come to its own, independent conclusion of guilt.”
271
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 511-14 & n. 74; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming
Appellate Activism,” 1354-56.
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U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (right to jury trial); U.S. Const. amend. VI (right to an
impartial jury); U.S. Const. amend. X (the “powers not delegated to the United States”
are “reserved … to the people”). Of course, this assumes the jury was not waived.
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assume a fact-finding position in conducting harmless error review. 273 By carving out the
constitutional error and selectively viewing only the remaining, allegedly untainted,
evidence, the appellate court makes a fresh determination of guilt, one based “upon facts
which have never been considered by a jury and which, given [the appellate court’s]
finding of guilt, never will be.” 274 It must be remembered that if the government cannot
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that its constitutional violation did not prejudice the
defendant’s rights, the result is a new trial, not an acquittal that sets the defendant free
forever. The Harrington standard of “overwhelming” record evidence review places
procedural efficiency and finality above the substantive right of the defendant to receive a
constitutionally-fair trial by a jury, even though the result is merely a redo. 275
Shifting of the burden of proof and inferences drawn in favor of the government,
on appeal, further impede the defendant’s basic fundamental right to a fair trial that is
devoid of any constitutional error. In our accusatory system, a criminal defendant is
presumed innocent unless the government establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for
every element of the crime charged. 276 The government must carry this burden of proof
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Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1193; the error is that “the wrong entity judge[s] the
defendant’s guilt.”
274
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430 & n. 67; ibid., 429, 427; The court “is
sitting as an appellate jury,” when appellate courts are not supposed to “act as fact-finders
for matters which must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt;” Chapel, “Irony of
Harmless Error,” 515; fact-finding is not the appellate court’s role or purpose. See also
infra nn. 286.
275
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514; “any system that demands fairness in its
proceedings but fails to provide for [it on] review mocks the concept of fairness.”
276
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358; explaining that the standard of “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt” gives “concrete substance” to the “presumption of innocence” by
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by constitutionally-permitted means 277 and the courts must label as foul any attempt by
the government to do so in violation of constitutional rights. These premises are bedrock
principles from which any jurist should start.
The “overwhelming evidence” test for harmless error converts this fundamental
constitutional framework using an alleged “no harm – no foul” theory 278 and, by its
application, has become a prosecutor-friendly test, in spite of criminal defendants’
constitutional rights. The Court is certainly free to employ the more stringent Chapman
standard for harmless error, 279 but the malleability of the chosen test has tended to lead to
a far higher percentage of affirmances using the Harrington test. 280 “The administration

ensuring against unjust convictions. Ibid., 363. See also Chapel, “Irony of Harmless
Error,” 511, 528; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2040.
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See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 458-59; Constitutional errors allow
jury consideration of cases that present incompetent evidence as if it were competent or
that omit other, significant, competent evidence. In turn, the violation “biases the trial in
favor of the state and denies the defendant due process;” ibid., 463-70; providing
illustrative examples, such as wrongful appeal to jury passions and prejudices or
comment on the defendant’s silence at trial, and explaining how they erode the
presumption of innocence, lighten the government’s burden of proof, and create an unfair
rebuttal burden of proof for the defendant.
278
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 437.
279
See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1360; “whereas the
Chapman test requires harmless error review to be uniformly strict, requiring reversal if
the error had any possible causal impact on the verdict, the [Harrington] test[] permits
movement [to] a fairly lenient review of the record.” Mitchell notes that the test chosen
often makes a difference to the case outcome. Ibid., 1335, 1338, 1347-51, 1363.
280
Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 62; ibid., 17-18; the malleability of the harmless
error test provides a “powerful tool” for a “result-driven court;” Greabe, “Riddle
Revisited,” 100, nn. 223-24; judges usually care about the strength of the evidence of
guilt rather than the standard employed to assess harmless error. See also Mitchell,
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1347-50; conducting an informal survey of
Westlaw cases and finding that federal courts are twice as likely to use the Harrington
test than to use the Chapman test; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1215-28; surveying 53
District of Columbia federal judges, prosecutors, and defenders, and finding that judges
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of the harm assessment test[] determine[s] the value of the rules that protect criminal
defendants. If the defendant cannot obtain a remedy because the court finds a lack of
harm, the right that was violated does not protect the defendant.” 281 The “overwhelming
evidence” harmless error test addresses neither the constitutional error nor the procedural
impropriety of the government’s conduct; instead, it goes in search of other record
evidence of guilt, without regard to the impact that the error or resulting government
presentation may have had on the jury. 282 As numerous commentators have noted,
“[t]he Court apparently views the ultimate end of the criminal process and constitutional
criminal procedure as securing the accused a fair trial. But, the Court has expressed a
reductionistic notion of what a ‘fair trial’ means, defining it merely as a trial designed to
produce a reliable verdict.” 283 This “end-justifies-the-means” approach, which Congress
rejected when it created the harmless error statute, 284 leaves the fate of a citizen in the

voted to affirm convictions even more so than did prosecutors, and that most were
persuaded based on “overwhelming evidence” that the defendant was, in fact, guilty.
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Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 995 & n. 13. Poulin also notes that in one-third of the first
200 cases wherein defendants were exonerated based on DNA evidence, the appellate
courts previously had affirmed based on the harmless error test, finding “overwhelming
evidence” of guilt, despite the defendants’ actual innocence. Ibid., 996.
282
Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1340; “what a jury might
have done in an error-free trial is irrelevant;” Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 396;
“this ostensible concern with the question of guilt is not rationally tied to the reliability of
the conviction.”
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Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 86; see also Murray,
“A Contextual Approach,” 1794; finding most troubling “the dissonance between the
modern harmless error doctrine’s reductionism and criminal procedure’s diverse
normative ambitions.”
284
The first proposed federal harmless error statute in 1908 effectively was a “correct
result was reached” approach. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64. Congress
rejected this approach in 1919 when, instead, it focused on the error and its effect on
substantial rights. Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2128, citing Act of Feb. 26, ch, 48, 1919,
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hands of a few, despite the Constitution’s clear construction to avoid this result. 285 It is
not the appellate court’s role to affirm a conviction based on its factual assessment that,
putting aside the error, the record otherwise shows the government had a strong case of
guilt. 286 In effect, this test shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that the
constitutional error affected the jury’s verdict, when, constitutionally, the government
bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 287
Even worse, some appellate courts have collapsed the “overwhelming evidence”
harmless error test into one of the mere sufficiency of the evidence, which represents no
more than “the baseline requirement” the government must meet in order to obtain a
conviction. 288 The government also is assisted, at times, by the appellate courts’ tendency
to view the record evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.
892, 992.
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Bihn, and Chapman; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277; wherein the Court reconfirmed the proper
roles of the jury and of the courts. See also Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427;
until the “overwhelming evidence” harmless error test, “no court had the power to enter a
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Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1009; ibid, 1046; harmless error test should require “more
than mere sufficient evidence;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Error,” 128; “the Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that harmless error analysis is
not a sufficiency of the evidence test.” But see, Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1187, Stacy
and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 128-30, Anderson, “Revising
Harmless Error,” 400; all noting that some courts find harmless error based merely on the
sufficiency of record evidence of guilt.
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prosecution. 289 As a preliminary matter, this focus constitutes yet another invasion of the
jury’s fact-finding role. Because jury deliberations occur in secret, involve the dynamic
interaction of twelve different personalities, and result only in a general verdict of guilt or
innocence, the appellate court cannot possibly know what evidence the jury credited,
what inferences it accepted, or how it weighed the various pieces of evidence and
inferences within the larger balance of the record. 290 At best, the appellate court’s
judgment “is based on its own probabilistic impressions of what a jury actually did,”
which necessarily reflects its “own views of the weight and credibility of evidence.” 291
In addition, while viewing the record evidence and drawing all inferences in the
government’s favor might be appropriate for a sufficiency of the evidence issue, the focus
should work in the opposite direction for harmless error review. 292 Under a sufficiency of
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Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on
Juries?” Wisconsin Law Review 1983 (1983): 1152-53.
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Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 133, 127, 130; see
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 516; the court “cannot possibly know or review what
in the minds of the jurors led to the verdict;” Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate
Activism,” 1358; the court is “hypothesiz[ing] a guilty verdict that was never in fact
rendered.”
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where the jury could convict if it drew the necessary inference in favor of the
prosecution.” (Emphasis original).
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the evidence challenge, no constitutional error is alleged, the record is not susceptible to
change, and the defendant simply claims that, based on a tangible and known record, the
government failed to produce proof for every element of the crime charged. In this
inquiry, the reviewing courts ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 293 They end their inquiry upon finding
record evidence to support the elements and, therefore, the resulting jury verdict of guilt.
By contrast, when a defendant alleges constitutional error, the record is not so
tangible and known. Depending on the alleged error, for example, the record might be
overinclusive because it contains evidence that should not have been admitted or
underinclusive because it lacks evidence that should have been admitted. In short, from a
constitutional standpoint, the record is not properly comprised. In this setting, where the
error is a constitutional violation committed by the government, which bears the burden
of proving harmlessness, the record should be viewed and all reasonable inferences
drawn in favor of the defendant. 294 Giving the government the benefit of the doubt, and
viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the government’s favor, significantly
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Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Compare Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; “The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that
the damaging potential of the [error] were fully realized, a reviewing court might
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis
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lightens the government’s burden of proof. 295 And, by doing so based on a tenuous
record, the appellate court merely speculates about what a jury might have done with a
proper record, devoid of the constitutional violation. Because, as a bedrock principle, the
government bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by
constitutionally-permitted means, giving the government the benefit of all favorable
evidence and inferences, when assessing constitutional error, compounds the
constitutional injury.
Notably, under both tests – sufficiency of the evidence and harmless error –
appellate judges may not substitute their personal viewpoints for that of the jury. 296 The
difference, however, is that, for sufficiency of the evidence, the court looks at an
untainted record to see if evidence exists to substantiate each criminal element; the court
need not speculate beyond what is there, in the record. For harmless error, however, a
constitutional violation taints the record, which, as a result, does not accurately reflect
what the jury should have considered. The court’s focus on the limited portion of the
record that it believes to be untainted does not solve the problem. The court should,
instead, focus on the constitutional error and recognize “that the jury might have
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Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1048, review of the record in favor of the prosecution biases
the court in favor of affirming the conviction; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error,” 128; “This approach obviously does not adequately protect a
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developed a reasonable doubt or credited different evidence if the case [had been] tried
without the [constitutional] flaw.” 297
B. Ill-Equipped to Perform Fact-Intensive, Retrospective Analyses
An issue exists, however, regarding whether appellate judges are equipped to do
so. As a preliminary matter, the cold, paper record on appeal, which some judges review
only in part, 298 is a poor substitute for the trial event, where the jury sees and hears all
witness testimony and evidence, first hand. Jury decisions usually turn on credibility calls
and witness demeanor. As Justice Traynor discusses, “age, sex, intelligence, experience,
[and] occupation” all factor into credibility determinations. 299 And only a person who
actually experiences a witness’ examination can assess witness truthfulness. The written
record on appeal does not reflect “the unreasonable pause, the inappropriate smile, the
sarcasm that changes a ‘sure’ which means ‘yes’ to a ‘sure’ which means ‘I don’t believe
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notes that this approach is particularly critical when the government’s case is purely
circumstantial or the defense theory of the case might have been impacted by the error.
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clerks. While some appellate judges may actually review the raw trial court record, even
then, the judges are a step removed from the live testimony of the real trial;” Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430; the record on appeal might not be accurate, complete,
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Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error,” 20-21; accord Edwards, “To Err is Human,”
1193-94 & n. 110.
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that’ or ‘I don’t agree;’” 300 it does not reveal that “a witness answered some questions
forthrightly but evaded others” or show that “a convincing and truthful answer in
writ[ing] … sounded unreliable at [trial],” or “[a] well-phrased sentence in the record…
[came across as] rehearsed,” or “[a] clumsy sentence [possessed] the ring of truth [when]
the witness groped his way to its articulation.” 301 And there is also the issue of
contradictory witness testimony and evidence, where jurors must choose between
competing versions of a story. 302 Only the spectators of the trial presentation can assess
what is true, half-true, or a lie. “There is a great risk that the appellate court will get it
wrong” in its review of the “cold, antiseptic record.” 303
Several experts opine that appellate court fact-finding and evidence-weighing
based on the cold, emotionless record fails to do justice and unconstitutionally violates
due process and the right to confrontation. 304 On appeal, a criminal defendant cannot
offer new arguments, supplement the record with new evidence, or even, necessarily,
answer the appellate judges’ concerns through oral argument. This lack of interaction is
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See Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1059; “Jurors relate to each side of the case as a
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particularly concerning. As the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers notes, oral
argument has great value from a systemic perspective:
[It] is the only time where a party and [his] advocate can interact with the
decision-maker. It is a time when the court’s views on the issues are on
display for the public and for [the parties], and counsel has the opportunity
to address potential [record] misconceptions or overlooked facts. In that
manner, oral argument is the most tangible manifestation of the critical
role that appellate courts play in the resolution of public and private
disputes traversing our legal system. 305
And yet, as the Academy points out in its Task Force Report and Initiative on
Oral Argument, with the exception of the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals, only about 22% of all federal appeals are granted oral argument before
a panel of appellate judges; 306 the remaining appeals are decided based on the parties’
briefs. 307 Even more notably, of those appeals decided based on the briefs, some might be
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percentage of oral arguments granted twenty years ago. See Debra Cassens Weiss, “Oral
72

handled primarily by court staff attorneys, who draft decisions and present them to judges
for their approval, and others might be handled primarily by a single judge, who
circulates a draft decision electronically to the remaining two judges. Whether the judges
always collaborate regarding the draft decision is uncertain. The Academy warns that this
process “invites[s] a moral peril: a judge engaged in other matters may sign off on a
trusted colleague’s draft without engaging in the case. And the third judge, unaware that
the second judge did not engage, is at even greater risk of failing to engage after a draft
has two votes.” 308 These dangers further call into question the logic and legitimacy of
harmless constitutional error review: a criminal defendant, who likely has no responsive
input to the judges, but whose liberty hangs in the balance, is strapped to a static record,
which is tainted with constitutional error, and based upon which, possibly, a sole judge,
or even a staff attorney, primarily determines whether the jury would have found him
guilty, anyway, despite the error. 309
Some commentators and empirical studies suggest that appellate judges do a
“poor job” in performing this task. 310 First, lay jurors and appellate judges do not process
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http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oral_arguments_are_losing_popularity_in_feder
al_appeals_courts_is_a_hot_cou/.
308
American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, “Task Force Report,” 4-5.
309
Contrast the English system, from which the American harmless error doctrine
emerged, but which, unlike the American system, does allow open response to judges’
concerns and introduction of new evidence and arguments on appeal. Chapel, “Irony of
Harmless Error,” 518, 531.
310
See Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 129 & n. 196;
listing citations.
73

cases in the same way. Lay jurors tend to relate to the parties’ presentations as if they are
narrative stories, with even slight inferences sometimes proving to be powerful 311 and
jurors’ life experiences informing their assessments. 312 The deliberative process further
impacts the ultimate verdict. Citing numerous studies, the Supreme Court in Ballew v.
Georgia explained that a jury of fewer than six jurors tends to lead to inaccurate and
inconsistent verdicts because they do not fairly represent a cross-section of the
community and often militate in favor of finding a defendant guilty. 313
As noted, appellate judges assessing harmless constitutional error do not
necessarily engage in a robust deliberation in making their decision. Moreover, judges
bring their own personal experiences, perspectives, and specialized legal training to the
decision-making process, and they often fail to recognize that certain admitted evidence,
omissions of evidence, or the interrelatedness of evidence might impact the record and
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See Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1059 & nn. 278, 280; noting that storytelling helps
jurors organize the evidence and, at times, might make their credibility determinations
appear less than objective; see also Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and Johnson,
“Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1153, “‘Hundreds of different elements enter into a
verdict – the education, associations, environment, family connections, religious
convictions, social habits, prejudices, ambitions, and moral character of each juror, which
must be multiplied by twelve for each panel.’” (Citation omitted).
312
See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, “Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62, no.
2 (1992): 189-206; noting that certain principles influence the jury’s acceptance of a
story, including a story’s coverage, coherence, and uniqueness.
313
Ballew, 435 U.S. at 229-34; citing numerous empirical and statistical studies and
finding that deliberation by a smaller number of jurors increases “the risk of convicting
an innocent person.” Ibid., 232.
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the jurors’ decision in a different way. 314 For example, errors relating to eyewitness
misidentification, false confessions, flawed forensics, and biased jailhouse informants,
can have a corrupting influence on the remaining evidence or an improperly bolstering
effect, 315 yet, routinely, these factors are overlooked when courts find the errors to be
harmless. 316 Similarly, evidence that appellate judges view as “merely cumulative or
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Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 401; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error,” 131; Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1059-60; Teitelbaum, SuttonBarbere, and Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1152-53.
315
Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 397-400: Eyewitness misidentification can
influence “subsequent identifications, and even confessions.” Ibid., 397. False
confessions not only have a “devasting effect” on a jury, but “one confession may lead to
a repetition, or a jailhouse informant’s claim that it was repeated.” Ibid., 398. Unvalidated
or improper forensics, such as “bite mark identification, blood serology, [and] hair and
fiber analysis,” may deprive a defendant of due process. Ibid., 399 & n. 55. And jailhouse
snitches may have been offered a favorable deal by the government without their bias
being revealed and requiring collateral challenge for introduction of “evidence outside
the record.” Ibid., 399-400. See Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” iii-xiii; adding to the
Anderson list: misinterpreted fingerprint evidence; flawed foot and tire print, voice,
handwriting, ballistics, and arson analyses; contaminated DNA evidence; and
manufactured or embellished false memories; Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 463-64;
adding to the Anderson list: faulty scent analysis testimony by a dog handler.
316
See, e.g., Garrett, “Judging Innocence,” 76-96; In his study of 200 wrongfully
convicted defendants, Garrett found: (i) of the 28% wrongfully convicted defendants who
raised witness misidentification, none of them prevailed, even though 78% of them were
convicted, at least in part, based on mistaken identification; ibid., 76, 80; (ii) no
defendant who challenged a false confession on direct appeal prevailed, although one was
successful on collateral review based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; ibid.,
90, 96; and (iii) of 12 defendants who challenged informant testimony, only one
prevailed. Ibid., 77, 86-87. See also Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” iv-vii; the National
Registry of Exonerations shows that “mistaken eyewitness testimony was a factor in
more than a third of wrongful conviction cases;” ibid., iv & n. 9; fingerprint evidence
suffers from a “significant rate of error;” ibid., iv; “voice identification errors are as high
as 64%,” “handwriting error rates average around 40% and sometimes approach 100%,”
“error rates for bite marks run as high as 64%,” and “hair comparisons are about 12%;”
ibid., iv-v; “wrongful convictions have been the result of faulty witness memories, often
manipulated by the police or the prosecution; ibid., vii; and “between 2 and 8 percent of
convicted felons are innocent people who pleaded guilty.” Ibid., vii & n. 34.
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impeaching” may have reinforced the “coherence and persuasiveness” of the defendant’s
case story in the eyes of the jurors. 317 In one empirical study comparing lay person,
lawyer, and judge behavior in reaction to numerous iterations of erroneously admitted or
omitted evidence, the authors found sharply varying decision-making among the three
groups, suggesting that the assessment of harmless error is highly subjective. 318 They also
uncovered that lawyers and judges often present with one of two mentalities, either proprosecution or pro-defendant, and that this personal mentality influences harmless error
outcomes. 319 It leads to “a result-driven approach,” whereby a judge may pick the best
articulation of the harmless error test to achieve a desired result. 320 These subjective,
even consciously-driven results led the study authors to conclude that harmless error
analysis is a “speculative enterprise” and that many judges substitute their own
viewpoints, with no real deference to the jury, let alone consideration of what the jury
might have done, had the error not tainted the record. 321
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Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1060; see also Pennington and Reid, “Explaining the
Evidence,” 189-91; jurors will accept the story with the greatest coverage and coherence.
318
Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1155,
1160
319
Ibid., 1173.
320
Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1352; “Personal values may
influence which test is chosen, with conviction-prone judges choosing the Harrington test
because of its grant of greater discretion to review the record. Conversely, reversal-prone
judges might choose the Chapman test because it calls for a very strict interpretation.”
Accord Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 17-18; the malleability of the test chose
provides a “powerful tool” for a “result-driven court;” Edwards, “To Err is Human,”
1210-28; surveying 53 federal judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys regarding
harmless error application and finding votes to affirm invariably came from prosecutors
and judges, while votes to reverse came from defenders.
321
Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1184,
1187-92. See also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 14-15; whose own study
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Further, psychological research shows that, in addition to being influenced by
their conscious leanings and subjective viewpoints, appellate judges may labor under the
effects of many subconscious biases, including hindsight bias, outcome bias, status quo
bias, confirmation bias, and belief persistence. Hindsight bias predisposes appellate
judges to look past the error and see a defendant as guilty based on the faulty belief that
the past jury verdict signifies future predictability, even on retrial without the error. 322
Outcome bias similarly influences judges to view the jury’s initial, albeit error-affected,
decision as correct, 323 and status quo biases reinforces this feeling, as the defendant no
longer presents as presumed innocent but, instead, as a convicted felon. 324 Confirmation
bias bears more upon actual record review, reflecting the judge’s tendency to interpret
and credit evidence in a way that supports the guilty verdict and discredit contradictory
evidence and inferences. 325 Belief persistence similarly causes judges to stick with an

revealed that wrongly-admitted evidence impacts jury verdicts, a defense objection to it,
at trial, exacerbates the impact on verdicts, and jurors are not likely to heed judges’
limiting instructions to ignore wrongly-admitted evidence.
322
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1039; Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott, “The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,” Wisconsin Law Review 2006 (2006):
317-22, 350; Jason M. Solomon, “Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can
Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials,” Northwestern Law Review 99, no. 3
(2005): 1086-87; see also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411-12, referring to
these cognitive phenomena as “mental contamination.”
323
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1039; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate
Activism,” 1353; Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,” 319-20; Winkelman
et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411-12.
324
Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411.
325
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1039; Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,”
309; see also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411-12; adding that because
judges are part of a judicial social network, they tend to lean toward affirming fellow
judges.
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initial assessment of guilt, resisting any change, even when undermining, erroneouslyexcluded evidence becomes part of harmless error consideration. 326
Often, these cognitive biases go unrecognized while the judge’s subconscious
mind tilts away from the harm and toward affirming guilt, despite knowledge of the
error. 327 And, even when the biases are recognized, they are difficult to resist. 328 Several
commentators posit that the ease of finding evidence supportive of guilt using the
“overwhelming evidence” harmless error test is exacerbated by these biases. 329 “The
number of cases in which the court[s] characterize[] the prosecution evidence as
overwhelming without careful scrutiny suggests biased review,” 330 yet another negative
facet of assessing, retrospectively, whether the error affected the defendant’s
constitutional rights. 331
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Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,”
313-14; see also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411; referring to “belief
persistence” as “coherence-based reasoning.”
327
Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,” 350; see Winkelman et al.;
“Empirical Method,” 1411; “mental contamination” causes judges exposed to the error to
make their views “cohere with that of the trial jury.”
328
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error,” 130-31.
329
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; see also Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error,” 130-31; noting courts deem errors harmless if the evidence is
“overwhelming,” even without assuring that the impacted evidence would not have
changed the jurors’ minds; Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1412; “the very
enterprise of after-the-fact review is doomed …. Judges simply cannot see the errors
because psychological biases make it hard to imagine that cases would have come out
differently.”
330
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040 (emphasis supplied).
331
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; see also Solomon, “Causing Constitutional Harm,”
1067; Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1412; one study found that “less than 20%
of the [judges’] analyses [even] used a test for determining harm,” and several studies
noted that resulting decisions seemed “arbitrary and conclusory.” C.f., U.S. Const.
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C. Evading Appellate Courts’ Constitutional Roles
Indeed, the disturbing trend among appellate courts not to give careful
consideration to the constitutional error, but, instead, to move directly to harmless error
analysis negatively impacts both the courts’ error review and law development roles. 332
At times, courts do not address the error at all or discard the error without analysis,
stating something like “even if” or “assuming” a constitutional violation occurred, the
error is harmless. 333 This approach skirts the appellate courts’ role to analyze
constitutional issues and provide guidance to the public, district courts, and prosecutorial
and defense litigants. 334 Written appellate decisions that interpret and explain

amend. VI; guaranteeing every criminal defendant the right to an impartial assessment of
guilt or innocence.
332
The appellate courts’ role in the judicial system is to review and correct error, interpret
the law, and supervise trial proceedings. Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 511-14 & n.
74; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1354-56.
333
See, e.g. Milton, 407 U.S. 371; “On the basis of the argument … and our examination
of the extensive record …, we have concluded that the judgment … must be affirmed
without reaching the merits of petitioner's present claim. Assuming, arguendo, that the
challenged [confession] should have been excluded, the record clearly reveals that any
error in its admission was harmless …,” ibid., 372; because the jury was otherwise
presented with “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” we find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury would have reached the same verdict. Ibid., 377-78. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct.
2187 (2015), “At issue here is Ayala’s claim that the ex parte portion of the Batson
hearings violated the Federal Constitution.” Ibid., 2198; “[W]e find it unnecessary to
decide that question.” Ibid., 2197; “Assuming without deciding that a federal
constitutional error occurred, the error was harmless ….” Ibid., 2198. See Chapel, “Irony
of Harmless Error,” 515, “by refusing to decide constitutional issues, courts “default[] in
performing … the functions which justif[y] its existence.”
334
Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 38; this process allows the court to skip any
consideration of the alleged error and affirm based solely on its harmless error factual
assessment that the defendant is guilty, thus impeding the law-declaration function of
appellate courts; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514-15; this process allows the court
to avoid deciding hard issues of constitutional law; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak
Thief,” 433; this process interferes with the orderly development of constitutional law.
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constitutional rights, along with the doctrine of stare decisis, 335 provide stability in the
law and notice so that individuals may guide their future actions. 336 By shortcutting the
appropriate order of analyses and assessing harmlessness as if it were the only issue,
appellate courts fail to provide guidance that – had it been given – might obviate future
constitutional violations and future appeals seeking to clarify the same constitutional
claims. 337
Of course, in a nuanced way, the opposite result may be true. By developing a
large body of jurisprudence based on the doctrine of harmless error, the Court has given a
sort of negative guidance to the public, courts, and litigants that it will not enforce
substantive constitutional rights or recognize the larger individual and institutional values
that they protect. For example, when the Court in Harrington adopted the “overwhelming
evidence” harmless error test, it implicitly telegraphed that a Bruton violation of the Sixth
Amendment’s confrontation right does not matter if, in the court’s view, the defendant is,
in fact, guilty. Thereafter, in later cases, the Court affirmed convictions using the same
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See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1824, n. 176, explaining stare decisis as a
“‘hierarchy’ … under which ‘precedents … enjoy a super-strong presumption of
correctness’” pursuant to the theory that “‘legislatures ‘remain[] free to alter’ judicial
interpretations ….’” (Citations omitted).
336
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514-15; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1980-82.
337
Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 38-39, 51; see Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,”
515; “If a court does not review alleged error, it provides no guidance for similar
problems which may arise in the future, and it cannot correct error if it does not review
claimed error;” Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; “What may be an important
[constitutional] question … is therefore sidestepped by the application of a doctrine that
itself presupposes the existence of such an error.” See also Goldberg, “Constitutional
Sneak Thief,” 434; “Ironically, harmless error is based on a concern for judicial
economy.”
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harmless error standard, despite Bruton violations in those cases. 338 In this way,
application of harmless error affects constitutional rights both affirmatively, by
depreciating their value, and negatively, by failing to address them when violated. 339
Constitutional rights are lost in the balance. Under the Harrington test, courts look only
to whether it believes the result is correct based on allegedly untainted factual evidence,
without regard to how the constitutional error might have affected the defendant’s rights.
The resulting body of harmless error jurisprudence then takes on a “quasisubstantive” life of its own as trial judges, prosecutors, and investigative authorities
operate within a system under which constitutional harms seem justified. 340 Implicit
within harmless constitutional analysis are the assumptions that: (1) “the state, in seeking
to deprive the accused of his or her life or liberty, has violated its own rules, the same
reason the accused was put on trial;” and (2) “[because] the error is deemed harmless[,]
the state ought not to suffer any sanction for the violation.” 341 In other words, it is okay
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See Schneble, 405 U.S. 427; Brown, 411 U.S. 223.
See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 435; When courts refuse “to decide a
matter on the merits in favor of a procedural doctrine invented to avoid retrials over
omitted ‘the’s,’ the loss is exceeded only by the danger of that same doctrine changing
the constitutional process without warning.”
340
Murray goes so far as to state “that stare decisis may prove to be a formidable
obstacle to harmless error reform.” Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1823. He notes,
however, that a way around this conundrum exists. The Supreme Court has held that
“[u]nless inexorably commanded by statute, a procedural principle of [significant]
importance should not be kept on the books in the name of stare decisis once it is proved
to be unworkable in practice; the mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike
from the perpetration of an unworkable rule are too great.” Ibid., 1825, n. 184 (citation
omitted); see also ibid.; “stare decisis applies much more strongly to rights than to
remedies.” (Citation omitted).
341
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 516.
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for the police and prosecutors to commit and trial courts to approve a violation of the
Constitution if, in an appellate court’s assessment, the defendant appears to be guilty
anyway. And this premise further assumes that an appellate court is capable of making
that factual assessment, which, for reasons previously discussed, is legally misplaced and
realistically doubtful. One begins to wonder why, or perhaps how, the constitutional
criminal rights contained in the Bill of Rights are still in existence. They have not been
eliminated by the people, through constitutional amendment. 342 Instead, they have been
diluted by judicial fiat 343 – itself a violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers 344
and the courts’ duty to protect and preserve the Constitution.345 Remarkably, an accepted
understanding for the Bill of Rights includes protection against arbitrary rule by a few
and government abuse of individuals when it so chooses. 346 The Court’s creation of a
“harmless constitutional error” doctrine thus turns the Constitution on its head on
multiple levels. It fails to deter governmental abuse or to recognize that larger
institutional values inform the Constitution’s provisions. 347
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343
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See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47; a divided government was chosen to prevent
“accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
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345
U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; U.S. Const. art. VI.
346
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 517; the courts have a responsibility to protect
constitutional rights against abuses by the executive and legislative branches of the
government and against oppressive majorities;” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,”
433; constitutional rights are meant to be permanent and “immune to the political process.”
347
Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; harmless error erodes constitutional rights and
fails to deter future misconduct; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 470;
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i. Failure to Deter Abuse by Those in Power
Harmless constitutional error that focuses on the weight of the evidence takes no
stock of the propriety of government actors’ conduct. 348 Instead, the more impactful
harmless error becomes in relation to a particular constitutional violation, the greater its
directive power over the behavior of police, prosecutors, and inferior courts. 349 Knowing
that a violation likely will not result in a conviction reversal, the police see little risk, for
example, in obtaining evidence illegally, forcing a defendant’s confession, or
manipulating testimony or evidence at trial. 350 For the same reason, prosecutors have

harmless error has “two pernicious effects”: (1) discouraging adherence to the rules, and
(2) systematic erosion of justice. See also Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate
Activism,” 1366; the Harrington standard does not deter official misbehavior and
reinforces government error and abuse.
348
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 995, n. 13; Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 38, 57-59;
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349
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 436-37 & n. 142; “[I]f a particular error is
declared to be harmless a sufficient number of times, then the cumulative effect of such
holdings will be that both the prosecution and the trial judge will tend to ignore error and
commit it again;” Albert W. Alschuler, “Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial
Judges,” Texas Law Review 50 (1972): 662; affirmances on harmless error grounds
“might be misread” by police and prosecutors as “evidence of the court’s willingness to
tolerate” error or even as “winking at lawlessness.”
350
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 439. See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 119596; citing examples of coerced confessions and unlawful searches and seizures that go
uncorrected and, therefore, embolden the police to violate the law. See also Garrett, 61;
“The message to law enforcement officers is that unconstitutional ends justify the means
to obtain evidence of guilt;” Kozinski, x & n. 49; “[t]he Justice Department and FBI []
formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave
flawed testimony in almost all [of the 268] trials in which they offered evidence against
criminal defendants over more than a two-decade period before 2000.” See, e.g., ibid, xi;
citing the 2013 release of a death row inmate convicted based on a supposed oral
confession that was fabricated by Detective Saldate, “a serial liar,” and citing a second
case where a defendant spent 39 years in jail based on a twelve-year-old boy’s eyewitness
testimony that had been “fe[d] to him” by the police.
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little incentive to avoid use of that evidence at trial 351 or to refrain from committing their
own constitutional errors, such as commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify or
withholding exculpatory evidence. 352 Even the prosecutor’s dual role “to seek justice”
has been massaged to be compatible with these actions. 353 Weak court enforcement of
constitutional obligations emboldens these state actors because they interpret judicial
nonintervention as judicial approval.
Thus, police, prosecutors, and courts watch carefully as a constitutionally-harmful
body of harmless error jurisprudence develops. The existence of this jurisprudence
permits police and prosecutors to view certain constitutional violations as legally
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See Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 297-298; arguing that prosecutors should
instead serve a gatekeeping role to prevent the use of dubious evidence.
352
See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 458-59, 463-70; demonstrating how
these errors allow jury consideration of cases that present incompetent evidence as if it
were competent or that omit other, significant competent evidence, thereby biasing the
case in favor of the government and eroding defendants’ presumption of innocence. See
also Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 61; “The message to prosecutors is that, if
there is some other reliable evidence of guilt, even a constitutional violation may be
excused.” See Kozinski, xxii-xxiii; “[T]here are disturbing indications that a non-trivial
number of prosecutors – and sometimes entire prosecutorial offices – engage in
misconduct … rang[ing] from misleading the jury, to outright lying in court and tacitly
acquiescing or actively participating in the presentation of false evidence by police.”
Ibid., xxii-xxiii.
353
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 438-39; “[T]he prosecutor’s duty to ‘justice,’
may raise some doubt about how he should respond to a constitutional violation, but the
prosecutor’s instincts as a lawyer combined with the harmless constitutional error
doctrine, demand that the prosecutor abdicate any role as a positive force for the
maintenance of constitutional guarantees;” Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,”
459; “Although the duty of the prosecutor is ‘to seek justice, not merely to convict,’ the
adversarial system demands aggressive advocacy to the limits of law.” (Citation omitted).
But see Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 468; “[L]eaving prosecutors to decide for
themselves what it means to ‘seek justice’ in any given situation is a doomed regulatory
strategy;” The Federalist No. 80: “No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause,
or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”
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acceptable and compels trial and intermediate appellate courts to find them acceptable
virtually in the same breath that they may disapprove of them. 354 As a result, government
actors are vested with discretion 355 to disregard the law, even to violate it deliberately. 356
Indeed, numerous reviews have documented just how frequently prosecutors do engage
in such actions. In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity reviewed almost 12,000, post1970 cases and found that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in more than 2,000 of
them. 357 Over time, the results have not improved. Tellingly, in 2016, the Innocence
Project drew direct connections between confirmed cases of prosecutorial misconduct,
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Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 437-38, 439 & nn. 157-58; because they are
compelled by binding precedent to so do, “the court[s] [keep] affirming and the
prosecutors [keep] [committing violations];” Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195; we can
hardly expect prosecutors to respect the rights of criminal defendants … when we as
judges are unwilling to do so;” Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 458-59;
“Appellate court expressions of disapproval and warnings of impropriety provide little
deterrence if convictions resulting from error-tainted trials are allowed to stand.”
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Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1796. Murray extends this unlimited license to the
courts and structural rights, arguing that “remedial deterrence” motivates courts to
construct the right in such a way as to avoid the consequence of an automatic reversal.
Ibid., 1810 & n. 107.
356
See Alschuler, “Courtroom Misconduct,” 631, 645-47; despite judicial condemnation
of prosecutorial misconduct, it continues; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,”
458-59 & n. 8; academic commentators “bemoan[] [the] frequency” of prosecutorial
misconduct;” Rachel E. Barkow, “Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office,”
Cardozo Law Review 31, no 6 (2010): 2090; prosecutorial misconduct “is not an
infrequent occurrence.” See also Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 86; “the current
system of harmless error does not provide prosecutors incentives either to educate
themselves on the law or to shy away from intentional or knowing misconduct;”
Kozinski, xxxviii; “Faced with the remote possibility of being found out, and the
likelihood that nothing bad will happen even if they are, many prosecutors will turn a
blind eye or worse.”
357
Brook Williams, “Methodology: The Team for Harmful Error,” last modified May 19,
2014, Center for Public Integrity, https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/methodologythe-team-for-harmful-error/. In addition, concurring or dissenting judges found
misconduct in about 500 more cases. Ibid.
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harmless error determinations, and discipline of prosecutors for their actions: of 660
cases of confirmed prosecutorial misconduct between 2004-2008, 527 cases were
affirmed based on harmless error review and only one prosecutor was disciplined. 358
Courts should hold legal authorities accountable for wrongful behavior. 359 In
those cases where courts have done so, defendants’ rights were vindicated even while
government actors continued to refuse to acknowledge their misconduct. 360 But the courts
do not take action often enough. And the Supreme Court, rather than exhorting them to
do so, has recognized absolute immunity for prosecutorial actions taken while in the role
of prosecutor and relegated enforcement of the law, against those obligated to uphold the
law, largely to other remedies. 361 As a review of recent research demonstrates, these
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Innocence Project, “Prosecutorial Oversight: A National Dialogue in the Wake of
Connick v. Thompson,” The Innocence Project. March 2016,
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See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 470; “The [c]ourts themselves are
instruments of law enforcement [and] [t]hey must preserve their own integrity;”
Kozinski, xxxiii; “[J]udges have an affirmative duty to ensure fairness and justice,
because they are the only ones who can force prosecutors and their investigators and
experts to comply with due process.”
360
See Kozinski, xxiii-xxvi; highlighting three cases where, despite being caught redhanded, prosecutors continued to resist acknowledging their misconduct until forced to
do so by district judge intervention or investigations. In the first case, the court ordered
an investigation that forced the Justice Department to admit its wrongdoing and move to
vacate the conviction. Ibid., xxiv. In the second case, the Ninth Circuit vacated a
conviction and, on remand, a State appellate court barred a retrial; still, the district
attorney complained about the courts’ actions. Ibid., xxv. In the third case, a court
disqualified an entire prosecutor’s office from further participation in the case based on
its manufacture of false confessions. Ibid., xxvi.
361
The Court has suggested that the following mechanisms will cause prosecutors to
comply with their constitutional duties: discipline by state bar associations, civil liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contempt of court, and criminal liability. See Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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remedies are rarely enforced and do not deter constitutional violations.362 Indeed,
prosecutor lobbying bars resist criminal justice reforms designed to hold them more
accountable. Paradoxically, many of the arguments they give equally underscore the
flaws in the harmless error doctrine that they use to support convictions: 363
Rules governing prosecutorial
conduct cannot take into account
“how prosecutors should behave in
a given situation;” “prosecutors’
conduct is too complicated to be
dictated by enforceable rules”
Rules governing prosecutors’
conduct “usurp” the role of the
legislature

Harmless error cannot take into
account what a jury would have
done in a given situation devoid of
constitutional error; jury conduct is
too complex to analyze by use of
the harmless error doctrine
The harmless error doctrine usurps
the role of the people, both by
weakening constitutional rights and
invading the jury’s role

362

The ineffectiveness of these “checks” on deterring police or prosecutorial misconduct
is well-documented. See, e.g., The Innocence Project, “Prosecutorial Oversight,”12-20;
Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 79-84; Alschuler, “Courtroom Misconduct,” 674;
Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 475; Barkow, “Organizational Guidelines,”
2090, 2093-98; Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 474-78; Fish, “Prosecutorial
Constitutionalism,” 254-59; Keenan, et al., “The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability,”
234-40; Ellen Yaroshefsky, “Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously,” University of the District of Columbia Law Review 8 (2004): 288.
Studies and news reports support these scholars’ views. See Ridolfi, Possley, and
North California Innocence Project, “Preventable Error,” 3; Of more than 4,000 appellate
decisions surveyed, the court found prosecutorial misconduct is almost one-fifth (707)
cases, but only seven prosecutors were disciplined; Armstrong and Possley, “The
Verdict;” finding more than 11,000 homicide cases involving prosecutorial misconduct
between 1963 and 1999, without a single one resulting in a prosecutor’s public sanction
and only two prosecutors suffering short term suspensions; Brad Heath and Kevin
McCoy, “Prosecuting Offices’ Immunity Tested,” USA Today (McLean, VA), Oct. 6,
2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/Washington/judicial/2010-10-05-federalprosecutor-immunity_N.htm; finding 201 prosecutorial ethics violations between 19972010, with only one prosecutor sanctioned. See also Joel B. Rudin, “The Supreme Court
Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or The Bar: Three Case
Studies That Prove That Assumption Wrong,” Fordham Law Review 80, no. 2 (2011):
539-41; finding rampant prosecutorial misconduct in the New York boroughs.
363
See Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 480-83; the source for all prosecutor argument
quotations within the chart. The comparisons to harmless error arguments are my own.
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Rule-makers have been “captured
by the defense bar”
Ethics rules will lead to “frivolous
and oppressive disciplinary
complaints” and a resulting waste
of “prosecutor’s time and
intrus[ion] into the[ir]
confidential” decision-making
“[H]eightened risk of discipline …
will make prosecutors overly
cautious, impeding their
effectiveness”
Defendants will take advantage of
the rules, “potentially creating
new, unintended legal rights”
“[N]orms governing prosecutors
are uncertain and contested,” and
as “elected or appointed” members
of a “democratic process,” they
should be “subject to political
accountability, not judicial
oversight”
Ethics rules are “over-inclusive”
and might “be interpreted to forbid
conduct that does not deserve to be
punished”
Conduct rules are “invariably
uncertain,” resulting in
“confus[ion] for prosecutors”
Conduct rules are “unnecessary”
because no “widespread”
prosecutorial misconduct exists
and “[s]ingling out prosecutors”
would be “unfair” and
“demoralizing”

The courts have been captured by
their use of harmless error
Harmless error has moved beyond
mere technicalities and minutiae,
leading to time-consuming
litigation about constitutional errors
and review of the “overwhelming”
record evidence, despite the jury’s
role as confidential fact-finder
Harmless error will allow
prosecutors to violate the law to
obtain convictions, regardless of the
impact on defendants’ rights
Prosecutors will take advantage of
harmless error, in spite of the
existence of constitutional rights
All power not granted to the
government rests with the people,
and the courts are accountable to
uphold the people’s constitutional
rights rather than negating them
through harmless error oversight
Harmless error can be interpreted to
punish innocent defendants while,
simultaneously, not punishing
government constitutional
violations
Harmless error makes the meaning
of constitutional rights uncertain,
failing to given guidance to the
public, courts, or litigants
Constitutional rights serve as
protection against government
abuse, and distorting these rights to
obtain convictions is unfair to the
defendant and detrimental to
society
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In sum, government actors do not appear to want judicial oversight; they want to
call their own shots. 364 But courts are obligated to cleanse the system of constitutional
errors, not to perpetuate violations or, worse, turn them into tools to be used against
defendants. 365 The harmless error doctrine has gone from closing reversal loopholes
created by mere technicalities, minutia, or defense inserted-minor errors, to allowing
police and prosecutors to commit and insert constitutional errors into the record for jury
consideration, with little-to-no ramifications. The Court has distorted the doctrine 180degrees from its purpose, and any judicial economy and finality achieved by its
application simply cannot sustain the harm done to individual and institutional
constitutional values. 366
ii. Failure to Protect Individual and Institutional Values
Several commentators have suggested that the harmless error doctrine no longer
serves its goals of economy, finality, and pragmatism. 367 Appellate courts now spend
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Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 480; “The thirty-year review of prosecutorial ethics is
largely a story about federal prosecutors’ obstruction of ethics regulation at every turn.”
365
See Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 176; “If the appellate court reverses a
conviction when error occurs, a prosecutor will have a greater incentive both to refrain
from committing intentional and deliberate errors and to invest resources in preventing
inadvertent errors from occurring than if the court, invoking the harmless error rule,
declines to reverse;” Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 467; additional rules governing
prosecutors’ conduct and stricter enforcement of existing rules are needed.
366
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 540; “courts [are what] stand between citizens and
a police state;” Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 62; harmless error “undermines
precisely those rights designed to prevent the wrongful conviction of the innocent.”
367
See Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2060-65; Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 45556; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 440-41; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,”
515; Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 181; Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,”
396-400.
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exorbitant resources on record review for “overwhelming evidence” of factual guilt,
which is an inefficient use of court time and inconsistent with its systemic purpose. 368
Harmless error also does not necessarily lessen the number of court proceedings or more
quickly bring matters to conclusion. For example, constitutional errors that allow use of
evidence that the prosecution otherwise would not have obtained, permit a trial to occur
that might not otherwise have happened, followed by an appeal from that trial, and
substantial time invested in that appellate review. 369 And, if the error ultimately is not
harmless, yet a second trial and, likely, a second appeal will occur for a case that the
prosecutor should not have brought in the first place. 370 The harmless error doctrine, thus,
increases both the number of criminal trials and appeals. If appellate courts would more
frequently enforce constitutional rights, rather than accepting their breach, multiple stages
of litigation could be avoided. 371 In addition, actually addressing constitutional errors,
rather than moving directly to harmless error review, would lighten appellate court
caseload “by laying down clear rules of law to guide prosecutors, defense counsel and
trial courts” for both current and future cases. 372 By contrast, “too lax a standard of
harmlessness … reduc[es] the cost to prosecutors of errors, increase[s] the number of

368

Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 515; “To pursue such a course in order to
determine whether error is harmless, so that judicial economy might be served is not only
ironic, it is nonsensical;” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 441; highlighting “the
increase in court time spent on [review] due to the ‘overwhelming evidence’ harmless
error test.”
369
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 440.
370
Ibid.
371
Ibid., 441; “As a corollary, suppression of a right increases the number of trials, which
will be followed by an appeal.”
372
Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 181.
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errors and hence the number of appeals and the number of issues per appeal ….” 373
Finally, as a practical matter, an original problem of defense attorneys inserting minor
technical errors into the record to trigger auto-reversal is simply inapplicable for
constitutional errors. “It is difficult [for defense counsel] to place a bad search, a bad
statement, a bad lineup, or other [government-controlled] error into the record.” 374
Nor does harmless constitutional error necessarily serve its additional goals of
ensuring fairness and public confidence in the justice system. 375 Once the Court whittled
the criminal trial’s central purpose to assessing factual guilt or innocence, 376 it reduced
review of constitutional errors to their truth-seeking function and the reliability of the
trial result. 377 But the reliability of the trial result cannot be presumed based on a review
of the untainted “overwhelming evidence.” As previously discussed, constitutional errors
affect the body of evidence that the jury considered and the jury might have “developed a
reasonable doubt or credited different evidence” 378 had the error not occurred. 379 The last
three decades of DNA exonerations prove that the harmless error “overwhelming
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Ibid.
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 441.
375
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2065; Anderson, “Revising Harmless
Error,” 396-400. See also Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 466-67.
376
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681; Rose, 478 U.S. at 578-79.
377
See Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 86-87; harmless
constitutional error “presumes the reliability of the result and judicial economy to be the
only values relevant to deciding the appropriate remedy for constitutional error;
(emphasis original);” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432; harmless
constitutional error effectively says that all other interests are outweighed by the
nonconstitutional value of judicial economy.
378
Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1049.
379
See supra nn. 291, 328-29 & accompanying text.
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evidence” test “is not rationally tied to the reliability of convictions” because it is not
conducted with “an awareness of the contributors to wrongful conviction[s].” 380 And
these exonerations stand as proof of criminal justice gone awry at times, with a resulting
loss of public confidence in the system. 381
Harmless constitutional error also trades individual and institutional protections
for the goal of punishing a presumably guilty defendant. The doctrine’s emphasis on the
trial result stands in stark contrast to the Constitution’s “broader ethical vision, which
encompasses a diverse array of ‘non-truth-furthering’ interests … in addition to ‘truthfurthering’ objectives.’” 382 These non-truth furthering interests serve as proxies for larger
societal values. Thus, the Constitution espouses broad ideals of individual autonomy and
dignity by resting primary power with the people, 383 limiting and separating the powers
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Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 396, 401; citing to the Innocence Project,
Anderson explains that “[w]ith the number of DNA exonerees …, it is no longer possible
to ignore the possibility of wrongful convictions;” John Paul Stevens, “Justice Stevens
Criticizes Election of Judges,” Washington Post, August 4, 1996,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-stat/sitemaps/archive-23.xml; “The recent
development of reliable scientific evidentiary methods has made it possible to establish
conclusively that a disturbing number of persons who had been sentenced to death were
actually innocent.”
381
Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 462; noting “public disillusionment” as a result of
wrongful convictions; see also Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2065; the care
taken to ensure due process will encourage public confidence in the system.
382
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1795. See also Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 94; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516,
532-33; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1366; Bilaisis, “Abettor
of Courtroom Misconduct,” 457-58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432-33; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2052-54.
383
Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516,
533; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432.
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of the government, 384 and protecting against unfair and abusive government actors or
majoritarian control. 385 The Constitution cements the right to a public trial before an
impartial jury of one’s peers 386 to ensure not only fairness, but also the expression of
community values, education of the public, and transparency and confidence in the
criminal justice system. 387 And, the Constitution provides the rights to privacy, 388 to
confront and compel witnesses, to legal representation, and against self-incrimination to
promote both the truth-furthering function of verdict reliability and the non-truthfurthering goals of fairness and protection from government abuse. 389
Any doctrine of harmless constitutional error that analyzes only truth-furthering
interests, to the extent it reliably can do so, 390 but neglects non-truth-furthering concerns,
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See U.S. Const. arts. I, II, III. See also U.S. Const. art. V; providing the process
whereby the people retain control over any amendments to the Constitution.
385
U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV. See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom
Misconduct,” 457-58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; Goldberg, “Constitutional
Sneak Thief,” 432; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 533; Fairfax, “Harmless
Constitutional Error,” 2053-56; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,”
1356.
386
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
387
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13, 1821; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom
Misconduct,” 457-58; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-56; Mitchell,
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1355-56; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless
Error,” 536-39; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-96; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 217880.
388
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812; Edwards, “To Err is
Human,” 1197-98; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2178-80.
389
U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 45758; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432-33;
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510. Murray creates a third category of “truthobstructing” objectives, which he states the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments also
serve. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13; see also Stacy and Dayton,
“Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 89, 110-13.
390
See supra Pt. B.
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ignores the Constitution’s complex structure and degrades those constitutional
protections that promote larger societal values. 391 “The Constitution does not create a
hierarchy of rights or values,” and there is no “reason to suppose that the framers
intended rights having truth-furthering purposes to carry more weight than rights having
other purposes.” 392 Instead, the Constitution aims to preserve and protect individual and
institutional rights against “contrary claims of necessity by the government,” 393 such as
those interests that are allegedly promoted by harmless constitutional error review.
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Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1813, 1799; see also Stacy and Dayton,
“Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 80-81; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,”
532; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1366.
392
Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 90. See also Murray,
“A Contextual Approach,” 1813; the Constitution’s “normative structure” “belie[s] the
notion that the pursuit of truth – or any other single value – constitutes criminal
procedure’s overarching ‘thrust.’”
393
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432.
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Chapter Five: Possible Solutions to the Harmfulness of Harmless Error Review
For decades, scholars have grappled with a harmless error doctrine that has
expanded beyond its purposes to infringe constitutional protections. Most commentators
agree that the Harrington test, which disregards the constitutional error in search of other
record evidence of overwhelming guilt, is wrong as a matter of law. 394 This test also,
simultaneously, permits those whom we entrust with enforcing the law, such as police
and prosecutors, to violate constitutional protections with little-to-no ramifications. 395
Proposed solutions to these dilemmas, however, have not proven to be any more
determinate, 396 and few of them get any closer to the original intent of the harmless error
statute. 397 Some scholars have continued to argue that harmless error review was never
intended apply to constitutional violations.398 But this position was rejected by the Court
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See supra Ch. 4. See also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24; “For federal constitutional
violations, “[the government must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[constitutional] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict,” and “the court
must be able to declare a belief that [the constitutional error] was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis supplied).
395
See supra Ch. 4, Pt. C(i).
396
See infra Pts. A and B.
397
Ibid. There are some exceptions, however, including the proposals of Justice Traynor,
Chief Judge Chapel, and Professor Greabe, who advocate a rights-based approach tied to
28 U.S.C. § 2111, with which I agree. See infra nn. 419-50 & accompanying text.
398
See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 441-42; “The Court should adopt a rule
of automatic reversal, fulfill its function with respect to the Constitution, and make its
judgments in full light of the undiluted effect of the rules it makes;” Wicht, “No Such
Thing as Harmless Constitutional Error,” 109; “[T]he current rule undermines the
inherent value of constitutional rights;” Dow and Rytting, “Can Constitutional Error be
Harmless,” 503-04; Advocating automatic reversal because the harmless error
counterfactual (i.e., had the error not occurred, the result would have been the same) is
not subject to “empirical verification” and, as a result, is “logically impossible.” Compare
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2031; advocating that that “any error that
wholly subverts the institutional role of the jury should be subject to automatic reversal.”
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in Chapman 399 and the harmless error statute, itself, draws no distinction between
constitutional and non-constitutional violations.400 The statute’s history also shows that
Congress considered whether applying harmless error to criminal trials might allow
constitutional criminal procedural rights to be “too easily relaxed” 401 and, still, it focused
the statute on “substantial rights,” without isolating constitutional from non-constitutional
errors. 402
Given the expansion of harmless error to reach most constitutional rights over the
last half-century, other scholars have offered different solutions based on the assumption
that the doctrine has become too ubiquitous to reject it 403 and the fear that too strict of a
rule might encourage courts to define constitutional rights narrowly. 404 Their proposals
range from advocating a return to the strict Chapman standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not impact the verdict, 405 to a rights-based approach
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Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21–22; “We decline to adopt any such rule.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; see also infra n. 431.
401
Dow and Rytting, “Can Constitutional Error be Harmless,” 486, 484.
402
In conducting constitutional and statutory interpretation, the Court must begin with the
text. Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts (Eagan, MN: West Publishing Company, 2012), 56.
403
See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1339 & n. 23; noting that
Goldberg’s position is well-founded, but believing that harmless error review is here to
stay, as that “the Court has not once [re]considered the validity of the doctrine.”
404
See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; describing such narrowing as “a kind of
backhanded use of the harmless-error rule;” Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810 &
n. 107; arguing that “remedial deterrence” motivates courts to construct the right in such
a way as to avoid the consequence of an automatic reversal; see also Traynor, Riddle of
Harmless Error, 43; if the test is too stringent, it will invite courts “to give [it] lip service
while tacitly discounting it;” accord Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533; if the test is
too lax, it will lead to automatic affirmances and violations of rights.
405
See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1199-1209; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming
Appellate Activism,” 1364-69.
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that focuses on the substantial right violated per § 2111, 406 to a remedy-based, contextual
approach that takes into account the truth-seeking and non-truth-seeking functions of the
constitutional right, 407 and, finally, to what may be considered a violation-based
approach, which incorporates harm as an element into the analysis of whether a
constitutional error occurred at all. 408 While each proposal offers a unique solution for the
malleability that has come to dominate harmless error review, at times they do overlap,
and they all unite in their rejection of the Harrington “overwhelming evidence” harmless
error test. But this rejection does not mean that other record evidence should be ignored.
As the following proposals show, the record provides the context for assessing the
alleged constitutional harm under most of these proposed tests.
A. Chapman’s Focus on the Verdict versus Section 2111’s Focus on Rights
The proponents of the Chapman standard draw much for the Court’s explanation
of it in Sullivan 409 and stress that only this single, strict test will protect constitutional
rights while serving the purposes of harmless error review. 410 The proper focus, they
argue, is on what the actual jury considered, including the error, not what a different,
hypothetical jury might decide, absent one. 411 The error, moreover, must be placed in the
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See Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533-40; Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error,
42-51; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 116-19.
407
See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810-20; Stacy and Dayton; “Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-98.
408
See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2158-63. The term “violation-based approach” is my
own, and should not be attributed to Professor Epps.
409
Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275.
410
See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1175, believing that the broad harmless error statute
does not offer sufficient guidance on what errors demand reversal.
411
Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1200-01; citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275; Mitchell,
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1368; same.
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context of the entire record, with appellate judges asking whether the error (1) involved a
“central issue in the case,” (2) “significantly undermine[d] the untainted evidence,” (3)
provided a “crucial link in the government’s case,” (4) “adversely affect[ed]” the
defendant’s ability “to present his case,” or (5) “shift[ed] the burden of proof from the
government to the defendant.” 412
For example, coerced confessions and erroneous jury instructions that omit or
seriously misstate a criminal element likely cannot be found beyond a reasonable doubt
not to have affected the jury under these criteria. 413 In the first instance, little evidence
presented to a jury can be more damaging to a defendant’s claim of innocence than a
confession. 414 In the second instance, because the jury failed to decide a critical element,
no actual verdict exists on which to conduct harmless error review. 415 In these scenarios,
while the Harrington harmless error test would lead to affirmance if other, overwhelming
evidence of guilt exists, Chapman’s test would not. By contrast, when erroneously
admitted evidence is insignificant, but other overwhelming evidence of guilt does not
exist, Harrington would require reversal while Chapman would not. 416 These sample
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Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1206. Compare Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and
Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1181; in inquiring into the actual jury’s
state of mind, courts should consider (1) “whether the tainted evidence itself added
weight to the government’s case,” (2) “whether the evidence added weight to other
evidence properly before the jury,” and (3) “whether the resulting increase in the weight
of the state’s case moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion
beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant’s guilt.”
413
Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1206; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate
Activism,” 1362; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-60.
414
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring); ibid., 292 (White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
415
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280; erroneous reasonable doubt instruction; Neder, 527 U.S. at
7; omitted element of “materiality.”
416
Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1362.
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juxtapositions demonstrate how Chapman – and not Harrington – both protects
constitutional rights and promotes the harmless error doctrine’s focus on “insignificant
errors.” 417 The Chapman test also ensures fundamental fairness by allowing the
defendant to argue the protective purposes of the constitutional right infringed, preserving
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury assessment of guilt without the taint of a
constitutional error, and preserving public respect for the system by foreclosing reversals
for insignificant mistakes or technicalities. 418
But proponents of the rights-based approach argue that the Chapman Court “lost
sight of [the harmless error statute and rule] and should have used them to ground its
harmless error [analysis].” 419 Their approach quite logically begins at the roots, with the
texts of the Constitution and harmless error statute, rather than Court interpretations.
First, the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that the founders believed to be so
fundamental to enshrine in them perpetuity, to protect against majoritarian control and
government tyranny. 420 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments outline
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Ibid.; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1206; the focus remains on the error’s impact
rather than on all of the evidence except the error.
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Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1209; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate
Activism,” 1364-69.
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Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 42; see also Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,”
535-40; noting that § 2111 and Rule 52(a) apply to both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 116; the Court should “jettison
Chapman in favor of a simplified, unitary, and transcontextual … test – reconceived as an
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Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533; “Because of our historical experiences, our
inherent distrust of government, and our anti-majoritarianism concerns, our legal system
places a high value upon individual rights and liberties. Any test of harmless error should
reflect these values;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 81;
“[T]he Court’s harmless error decisions rest on a premise that ignores the purposes of
many fundamental constitutional protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”
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“the minimal parameters” for the fair jury trial that is required by Article 3, § 2. 421 These
amendments also extend beyond individual protections for the defendant to larger
societal and institutional concerns underlying our democracy, 422 such as participation of
the community through the jury system and assurance of public confidence in the
legitimacy of our laws and judicial processes. 423
Second, for appellate review, Congress created a harmless error statute hinged to
protecting “substantial rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111 provides: “On the hearing of any appeal
or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record, without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.” 424 Proponents of the statute-based test argue that the focus should be on these
rights and the effect of their violation on the accused. 425 While some scholars and judges
disagree that this statute provides the basis for review of constitutional errors, 426 the plain
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28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018); stating: “Any error,
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Some scholars argue that harmless constitutional error is not statutory, but a form of
“constitutional common law.” For example, Meltzer says that if § 2111 was meant to
make conviction reversals harder, Chapman would not have imposed a more demanding
reversal standard for constitutional errors. Meltzer, “Constitutional Remedies,” 20-26.
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language of its text does not distinguish between constitutional and non-constitutional
violations. 427 Instead, Congress chose the words “substantial rights.” 428 Most scholars
and judges would agree, however, that, as a theoretical matter, a constitutional right is a

appropriate congressional action’ provides a strong clue that the Court thought it was
doing something more legislative than … constitutional interpretation.” Epps, “Harmless
Errors,” 2150. But Epp’s reverse-juxtaposition of these quotations appears to distort the
Court’s meaning. The Court actually stated: “We have no hesitation in saying that the
right … – expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself – is a federal right which, in
the absence of appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by
fashioning the necessary rule.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21. The Court in Chapman also
cited § 2111 and Rule 52(a). See infra n. 427. Later justices and scholars have claimed,
however, that harmless constitutional error is not statutorily-based, but, rather, based on
yet a third option: the Constitution’s requirement of due process. See, e.g., United States
v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 460 (1986); Justices Brennan and Blackman, concurring and
dissenting, stating that “constitutional errors are governed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than by § 2111 or Rule 52(a);” Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 424, n. 31; describing Chapman’s rule as a “constitutional
judgment”.
427
See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22; “[T]he United States long ago through its Congress
established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for ‘errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111. None
of these rules on its face distinguishes between federal constitutional errors and errors of
state law or federal statutes and rules;” Lane, 474 U.S. at 445; majority noting that § 2111
does not distinguish error types, but instead rests on substantial rights; Gonzales-Lopez,
548 U.S. at 157; Justice Alito arguing, in dissent, that Rule 52(a) applies to all
constitutional errors. See Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 57; “Since Section 2111
does not distinguish constitutional violations from other errors, it apparently governs
them also ….”; accord Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 534; Greabe, “Riddle
Revisited,” 119.
428
Congress rejected a Harrington-like, “correct result was reached” approach in 1919
and, instead, focused on the error and its effect on substantial rights. Murray, “A
Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2128; citing Act of Feb.
26, ch, 48, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, 62 Stat. 892, 992. A text should be interpreted only within the range of “textually
permissible meanings,” choosing an interpretation that “would serve, rather than
frustrate, [its] manifest purpose,” and without supplementing it, as the text’s “limitations
… are as much a part of its ‘purpose’ as its affirmative dispositions.” Scalia and Garner,
Reading the Law, 57, 174-79.
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substantial right 429 and, as a threshold matter, an error must occur before the harmless
error statute applies. 430 Thus, giving effect to the words Congress used, 431 the harmless
error statute appears largely to turn on what the nouns “error or defect” and the verb
“affects” mean when assessing whether an “error or defect” “affects substantial
rights.” 432 In United States v. Olano, the Court explained that “defect” is synonymous
with “error,” 433 which it defined as “[d]eviation from a legal rule” that has not been
knowingly and voluntarily waived. 434 The verb “affects” subscribes to the broad
definition of “to influence in some way,” 435 and it has been interpreted liberally in the
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See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2151; “There is something unquestionably troubling
about providing no remedy whatsoever for a recognized violation of a right important
enough to be enumerated in our nation’s founding charter ….” But see Chapman, 386
U.S. at 22; “[T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless.” (Emphasis supplied).
430
If no constitutional “error or defect” exists, then there is no “object” for harmless error
assessment. See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; “application of [the] doctrine …
presupposes the existence of … an error.” But see Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2158-63;
incorporating harm analysis as a component of defining the right.
431
“In construing a statute, [the Court is] obliged to give effect, if possible, to every
word” and should not interpret the statute in a way that would render “evasion under the
law … almost certain.” Scalia and Garner, Reading the Law, 63-64, 174-79.
432
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018).
433
Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33; “the phrase ‘error or defect’ is more simply read as
‘error.’”
434
Ibid. The Court contrasted forfeiture: “whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the
timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.’” Ibid.
435
“Affect vb. (15c) 1. Most generally, to produce an effect on; to influence in some
way.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), accessed March 29, 2019,
www.westlaw.com.
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less-demanding civil context. 436 Yet, the harmless error statute also requires “an
examination of the record.” 437 Thus, the context in which the error occurs also matters. 438
Scholars of the right-based, § 2111 approach delineate categories for determining
whether, in the context of the trial, an error affects the accused’s substantial rights. 439 The
first two categories are easy. First, “if in no event could the error be considered as not
having a significant adverse effect,” then the court should summarily reverse and order a
new trial. 440 Examples, such as complete denial of the right to jury trial, to testify, to
assistance of counsel, and to an impartial judge, sound very much like the “structural”
errors noted by the Court in Fulminante. 441 Second, if “the error can in no event rise
above insignificant error,” then the court should summarily affirm the conviction. 442
Examples include quintessential harmless errors of mere technicality, etiquette, and
formality, such as an omitted word or date or shackling the defendant when the jury
cannot see it. 443 The third category proves most problematic, however, as it captures
those errors with a “high risk of affecting rights.” 444 In this setting, the rights-based
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“[A]ffects doctrine (1996) Constitutional law. The principle allowing Congress, under
the Commerce Clause, to regulate intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. • The doctrine is so called because the test is whether a given
activity ‘affects’ interstate commerce.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), accessed
March 29, 2019, www.westlaw.com.
437
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018).
438
See supra n. 429; see also Scalia and Garner, Reading the Law, 33; “This critical word
context embraces not just textual purpose but also … a word's immediate syntactic
setting—that is, the words that surround it in a specific utterance.” (Emphasis original).
439
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 534-40.
440
Ibid., 534.
441
Ibid., 535-36; see also supra Chapter 3, Pt. D. & accompanying text.
442
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 534.
443
Ibid., 536-37.
444
Ibid., 537.
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approach directs (1) identification of the right involved and its purpose, (2) consideration
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the error, and (3) assessment of whether
failure to enforce the right would impair the deterrence effect against wrongful
government conduct. 445 Proponents of this approach appear to lean toward reversal when
government misconduct is knowing or intentional, when failure to reverse will encourage
future violations, or when a right promoting a significant societal value, such as
nondiscrimination, is impacted. 446 Closer calls, such as introduction of a defendant’s
prior criminal activity447 or an error in jury instructions, hinge to how significant an
impact the error likely had on the jury. 448 Again, the assessment is of the actual jury, not
a future hypothetical one, 449 but the proponents of this test submit that it will not result in
more reversals than the Chapman test would. 450
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Ibid., 534. Compare supra Chapter 3, nn. 249-52 & accompanying text; the Court has
discerned three viable purposes that can render an error harmful per se: (1) the error
causes unfairness “either to the defendant in the specific case or by pervasive
undermining of the systemic requirements of a fair and open judicial process;” (2) the
“effect of the error is too difficult to measure or ascertain;” or (3) the “right at issue is not
designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some
other interest.”
446
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 537-40.
447
These scholars draw no distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
violations and eschew categorization of constitutional violations as either structural or
trial errors. Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 535, Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error,
42, 48-49; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 119.
448
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 537-40. E.g., introduction of a speeding ticket
pales by comparison to introduction of a ten-year-old manslaughter conviction in a
murder trial, and a jury instruction that is beneficial to the defendant, or merely
duplicative, differs in impact from one that omits or misstates an element. Ibid.
449
Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 22; “The crucial question is not what might
happen tomorrow on an edited rerun, but what did happen yesterday on the actual run.”
450
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 539; see Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 4251; Greabe, 116-19, both arguing that this test would employ a “highly probable” (or
“clear and convincing evidence”) standard, whereas Chapman mandates a “beyond a
reasonable doubt” (or “almost certain”) standard.
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B. Remedy-Based Approach versus Violation-Based Approach
A majority of scholars argue that harmless error review is remedy-based and
designed to assess what action, if any, is needed to redress an acknowledged
constitutional violation.451 A minority view posits, instead, that the “harm” inquiry is
really an element in determining whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. 452
Recent work in these areas highlight the differences between the two positions as well as
the nuances within each one. 453 While neither view is perfect, the remedy-based approach
and its recognition of a constitutional violation seems sounder than an approach that
defines the scope of the constitutional right based on whether harm occurred.
The remedy-based approach promoted both recently and by past scholars first
must be distinguished from the result-driven approach of Harrington. While Harrington
largely ignores the constitutional error in search of other record evidence of guilt, the
remedy-based approach contextually asks “not just whether an error contributed to the
outcome, but also the implications of an error on the broader ‘constellation of interests’
served” by the constitutional rule.” 454
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See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793; harmless error review is “a set of
closely related remedial rules;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Error,” 91; harmless error is a “remedial rule,” Meltzer, “Constitutional Remedies,” 17;
“harmless error is best viewed as a question of remedies.”
452
See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2121.
453
See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” (2017); Epps, “Harmless Errors,” (2018);
Brandon L. Garrett, “Patterns of Error,” Harvard Law Review Forum 130, no. 7 (2017);
responding to Murray; John M. Greabe, “Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error:
A Response to Professor Epps,” Columbia Law Review Online 118, no. 6 (2018),
https://columbialawreview.org/content/criminal-procedure-rights-and-harmless-error-aresponse-to-professor-epps/.
454
Garrett, “Patterns of Error,” 288; quoting Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1811.
See also Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-98; ibid, 94;
the criminal process possesses a broad array of “non-truth-furthering” values. Murray
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This constellation of interests includes not only “truth-furthering” functions, but
also “non-truth-furthering” ones. 455 And many rights have “mixed purposes,” 456 both to
foster the “truth-furthering” interest in the reliability of the outcome 457 and promote
“non-truth-furthering” interests that extend beyond a particular defendant’s concerns. The
Fourth Amendment protects the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, 458 and guards an individual’s privacy interest, deters abusive police conduct
violating this right, and results in exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence at trial. 459
The Fifth Amendment prohibits charges without indictment by a grand jury based on
probable cause, being placed in jeopardy for the same offense twice, being compelled to
incriminate one’s self, and deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. 460
This provision of due process is furthered by the Fourteenth Amendment, which adds the
right to equal protection to prevent prejudice and discrimination. 461 And the Sixth
Amendment elaborates on trial rights, namely to know the nature and cause of the

notes that Judge Chapel’s proposal is not incompatible with a contextual, value-based
approach, as it also asks “‘whether any error had a significant effect upon a right of the
accused’” and would answer that question based, in part, on the “‘purpose’” of the
infringed rule. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1797, n. 31; quoting Chapel, “Irony of
Harmless Error,” 534.
455
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810-20; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-98. Writing twenty years after Stacy and Dayton,
Murray notes that his and their views regarding redressability for non-truth-furthering
interests do not always coalesce. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1813, n. 126.
456
See Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 89; Murray, “A
Contextual Approach,” 1812.
457
See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. IV.
458
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
459
See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1197-98;
Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2178-80.
460
U.S. Const. amend. V.
461
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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criminal charge pressed, to confront and compel witnesses and have assistance of counsel
in presenting a defense, and to a speedy and public trial before an impartial jury. 462
Larger interests linked to individual dignity and autonomy as well as community
participation, oversight, and confidence in the judicial system inform many of these
amendments. Proponents of the remedy-based, contextual approach urge that when a
constitutional error triggers concerns about “non-truth-furthering” interests, courts must
carefully scrutinize the impact on those interests in fashioning the appropriate remedy. 463
The exact test to be applied as articulated by these scholars differs in some
respects, although their analytical outcomes appear to be similar. Some scholars posit that
the court should consider: (1) “whether the violation has impaired … the constitutional
right in question;” (2) “whether redoing the adjudicative process can … cure the harm
caused by the violation;” and (3) whether “reversal [may be] necessary to deter future
violations.” 464 A more recent iteration states that the court should: (1) “begin by
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U.S. Const. amend. VI.
See, e.g., Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 93-98;
advocating reversal, for instance, for denial of the right to self-representation because it
implicates dignitary and autonomy concerns; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 181020; adding, as an example, violation of the right against self-incrimination “out of
‘respect for the inviolability of the human personality.’” Ibid. 1812 (citation omitted).
These authors also list in the “non-truth-furthering” category the right to a jury and right
against discrimination because of the societal concerns associated with community
participation and fair play. Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Error,” 110-13; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13.
464
Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-92. As examples,
violation of the right to confrontation might not require a redo, provided the excluded
evidence was proffered into the record, whereas violation of the right to counsel would
require a redo because the record lacks counsel’s input. Ibid., 93. By contrast, while
introduction of illegally obtained evidence might have but a minimal effect when
considering the entire record, a redo might be desired to deter future violations. Ibid., 9596. And, when the violation is one likely to escape detection, such as withholding
463
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identifying the interest (or range of interests) protected” by the right; and (2) “conduct
contextual harmless error review … [so that the] remedies … correspond” to protecting
those interests. 465 This latter test would also, however, take deterrence into account when
the right involved implicates that concern. 466 Ultimately, the goal of the tests is “to
address the serious concern that ‘nearly ubiquitous use of a harmless error rule focusing
on the outcome of the trial … denigrates important constitutional protections … that
promote values other than the reliability of verdicts.” 467 Reversal and a new trial, perhaps
even sanctions, may be required to vindicate these “non-truth-furthering” protections. 468

exculpatory evidence or offering perjured testimony, reversal and redo are necessary to
eliminate future incentives to commit the same wrongdoing. Ibid., 95-98.
465
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1795. Murray further cabins these interests into
two sub-categories: result-correlated interests and result-independent interests. Ibid.,
1814-20. Result-correlated interests, such as the Fourth Amendment’s interests in
protecting privacy and deterring future violations, will negatively impact the truth- and
non-truth-furthering functions similarly, depending on the extent to which the illegallyintroduced evidence enhanced conviction chances. Ibid., 1815-16. By contrast, resultindependent interests, such as discrimination in jury selection, which creates bias in the
proceeding and erodes public confidence, do not necessarily align with the truth-seeking
interests or, if they do, only coincidentally. Looking purely at the case outcome,
therefore, will not vindicate these interests. Ibid., 1817-18.
466
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1820-23; citing a “prototypical” case involving
failure of a judge to recuse where there appeared to be a conflict of interest or bias.
Noting that the purpose of the rule “‘is to promote confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety,’” on harmless error review, the Court
considered three factors, only the first of which related solely to the “truth-seeking”
interest: (1) “the risk of injustice” to the parties in the case; (2) “the risk that the denial of
relief will produce injustice in other cases;” and (3) “the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the judicial process.” Ibid., 1821 (citation omitted). The second prong
focused on “deterring future infractions” and the third prong focused on “shoring up
judicial legitimacy,” both of which are “non-truth-furthering” interests. Ibid., 1822.
467
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1799; quoting Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 80-81. As noted, Murray’s and Stacy and Dayton’s
arguments and goals are similar.
468
Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 95-98; Murray, “A
Contextual Approach,” 1813, 1818-20. But see Garrett, “Patterns of Error,” 288, 293-95;
responding to Murray, inter alia, that his contextual approach likely will confer more
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By contrast, the recently-espoused, violation-based approach would fold the harm
inquiry into the assessment of whether any constitutional violation occurred at all. 469 This
premise essentially conflates the error with whether it resulted in any harm, “inexorably”
tying harmful- or harmless-ness with the process of defining the right. 470 As a result,
harmless error no longer serves as a remedial review standard, but, instead, becomes part
of the substantive nature of the right itself. 471
As a preliminary matter, for scholars who view the harmless error statute as
applicable to constitutional errors, the violation-based theory is a non-starter. 472 It makes
harmless error analysis part of determining whether an error occurred, but, under the
statute, an error must exist, first, for harmless error review to apply. 473 Next, the proposal
renders the meaning of constitutional rights nebulous by tying their meaning to the
peculiar facts of each individual case. It therefore offers no guidance to American

discretion on judges to rely on their cognitive biases and personal value judgments.
“Telling judges to broaden their focus is unlikely to help,” Garrett says. Ibid., 295.
469
Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2158-63.
470
Ibid., 2121-22; the appellate court “is really asking whether a defendant’s
constitutional rights have been violated at all.”
471
See Ibid., 2163; “[I]f one understands harmless error as part and parcel of
constitutional rights, and not as part of the law of remedies, the mystery vanishes.” And
see Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 119, 121; noting that under Epps’s proposal, harmless
error would no longer be a remedial doctrine.
472
See supra n. 426 & accompanying text. But see Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2144; The
Supreme Court’s harmless error “‘cases are not about figuring out what Congress meant,
in 1919, by “affect the substantial rights of the parties.”’” (Citation omitted).
473
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018); stating in pertinent part: “On the hearing of any appeal …,
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record, without regard to errors
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights.” (Emphasis supplied). See also Fed.
R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018); stating: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does
not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” (Emphasis supplied). In my view, both
the statute and the rule assume an error has occurred. But see Epps, “Harmless Errors,”
2165; arguing that, rather than providing a remedial review standard, the statute simply
“command[s] against overenforcing rights.” (Emphasis original).
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citizens, who have a fundamental right to rely on the Constitution’s protections before
they act, and it strips the right of any objectively identifiable meaning, effectively
rendering the right valueless. In addition, trial judges, who must decide in the midst of
proceedings, before the record is fully developed, whether a constitutional violation has
or is about to occur, have no direction if the right’s meaning is yet-to-be-determined by
an appellate court, on review of the particular case. 474 This dynamic also creates a
disconnect between what rights mean at the trial court and appellate court levels. The
proponent of the violation-based test implicitly acknowledges this weakness by urging
trial courts to act more stringently when faced with a potential constitutional violation. 475
But, as a responsive scholar has questioned, "if trial courts should [take such action], why
should appellate courts more narrowly define the scope of the relevant right?” 476
Finally, the violation-based test begs the question of what constitutes sufficient
harm to require reversal by merely moving the harm assessment to a different place. Any
analogy to those few constitutional issues that do incorporate harm into the analysis of
assessing a violation, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence, 477 are distinguishable. “Neither … right is enumerated in the
Constitution and neither right is typically capable of being asserted … and vindicated in
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Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 124-26.
Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2171.
476
Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 125. Paradoxically, the proponent simultaneously
argues that the violation-based approach “would require courts to be clearer about the
values at stake.” Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2186.
477
See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2160, arguing for extension of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668
(ineffective assistance of counsel) and Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (failure to disclose exculpatory
or impeaching evidence). Both tests embed the prejudice requirement into the elements of
proving the violation.
475
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real time …, before a violation occurs.” 478 In addition, the violation-based test runs the
risk of diluting constitutional rights by making the harm assessment determinative of
whether the right, as articulated in the Bill of Rights, even exists and, if so, to what
extent. 479 It easily could result in courts defining constitutional rights narrowly in their
assessment of whether harm occurred in the context of a particular case. 480
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Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 126. See also Ibid., 123, quoting Epps, “Harmless
Errors,” 2170, who concedes that, outside of Strickland and Brady, the Supreme Court
has rejected the suggestion to treat harm as part of the determination of whether a
violation occurred in other constitutional contexts.
479
Ibid., 125.
480
Compare Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; noting, based on his experience as a
judge, that an automatic-reversal rule would encourage courts to define constitutional
rights more narrowly. Here, the same could occur as appellate courts define “rights” as
part of a “violation” determination that incorporates “harm” in the context of particular
case facts. The global impact of those holdings might potentially narrow constitutional
protections across-the-board. See also Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 126. Ibid.; noting
that Strickland and Brady have come under “criticism for being insufficiently protective
of the rights of criminal defendants.”
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
At bottom, a Constitution that is by and for the People means that constitutional
rights should reflect what society deems to be acceptable, which is why the jury role is so
important. 481 The government does not confer rights and liberties. It exists only to protect
and uphold them. 482 And, yet, the prevailing harmless error doctrine allows courts and
government officials to disregard constitutional rights, effectively neutering violations
and eviscerating constitutional principles. 483 As the prior discussions show, no readilyavailable solution is in sight. Scholars agree that harmless error has exceeded its original
purposes but cannot agree about how to fix it. 484 As demonstrated by numerous close
cases from the Supreme Court, the justices also are divided. 485 The harmless
constitutional error doctrine has become a legal quagmire of indeterminacy, malleability,
and unpredictability.
A correction from the Supreme Court or from Congress is long overdue.
Enforcement of constitutional rights should not be “exceedingly rare.” 486 Control over
life and liberty by appellate judges using a doctrine designed to promote economy,
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See supra Chapter 4, Pt. A.
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 509.
483
See supra Chapter 3.
484
See supra Chapter 5.
485
See Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279; where the Court splintered in several directions
concerning whether coerced confessions can be harmless; Neder, 527 U.S. 1; where the
Court divided six-three concerning whether omission of a criminal element from jury
instructions can be harmless; Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140; where a five-four vote
determined whether denial of counsel can be harmless; Williams, 136 S.Ct. 1899; where a
six-three split addressed failure of a judge to recuse; McCoy, 138 S.Ct. 1500; where a sixthree vote addressed deprivation of defendant’s autonomy to decide whether to admit
guilt or maintain innocence.
486
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793.
482
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finality, and pragmatism 487 is precisely what the founders sought to prevent by installing
permanent protections in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 488
This disassociation of constitutional violations from judicial remedies also
contradicts the harmless error statute’s terms and breaches the Court’s obligation to adopt
remedies that safeguard constitutional rights. 489 The statutory terms allow a finding of
“harmlessness” only when the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. 490
The Court in Chapman wrongly shifted the focus away from the error’s effect on rights to
the error’s effect on the verdict. 491 Later, in Harrington, it egregiously shifted the focus
away from even the error, to a review of other, untainted record evidence. 492 Justice

487

See supra Chapter 4, Pts. A & C.
See supra Chapter 2.
489
Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 57, n. 104; see Murray, “A Contextual
Approach,” 1794; the harmless error rule is the “leading contributor to the expansive gap
between rights and remedies in criminal procedure;” Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 56; harmless error “has the capacity to permanently sever rights from remedies;” Epps,
“Harmless Errors,” 2151; “there is … something troubling about providing no remedy …
for a … violation of a right important enough to be enumerated in our nation’s
[Constitution].” It is worth emphasizing, at this point, that the Supreme Court has an
obligation to preserve and protect constitutional rights. Chapel, “Irony of Harmless
Error,” 510, 517.
490
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018).
491
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 506-07; claiming the error’s effect on the verdict
is irrelevant under the statute’s terms, and the court has “rewritten the statute through
judicial interpretation.” Ibid., 530-31.
492
Ibid.; asserting other record evidence of guilt simply is not part of the statutory test.
Explanations for this change in approach go beyond mere changes in the Court’s
membership. Chief Judge Edwards notes the coincidence of the “overwhelming”
evidence test with the significant increase in crime and judicial dockets in the United
States in the 1960s. The number of appeals virtually tripled during the Burger and
Rehnquist Court eras. Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1191 & n. 103. As Goldberg
complains, however, “if society … has been damaged by the change in the relationship
between the individual and the state as incarcerator, that is a matter to be addressed on
the merits, not through the procedural backdoor of harmless error review.” Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432.
488
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Benjamin Cardozo “long ago noted ‘[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the
limit of its logic.’” 493 It is time for a history lesson on why the harmless error doctrine
exists and a constitutional lesson on why it cannot be used to subordinate constitutional
protections. 494
Numerous articles and studies have documented the Court’s slide down the
slippery slope, shifting from greater recognition of inviolate constitutional rights, to a
focus on the impact of the constitutional violation on the verdict, and, finally, to review
of the untainted record evidence, apart from the constitutional error, in search of
“overwhelming evidence” of guilt. 495 Prevailing harmless error review today thus
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Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1173; quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921): 51. See also Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 426; “Any new doctrine or exception to an established
doctrine must be expected to grow past the parameters set in the decision which created
it.”
494
I realize, and accept, that the result likely will be that more constitutional violations
result in reversal. As emphasized previously, however, reversal does not result in
acquittal. It results in a new and fair trial, which is not too large a sacrifice for our society
to make when considering that an individual’s life and liberty are at risk and larger
societal protections against government control, even abuse, are at issue. See supra
Chapter 4, Pt. C.
495
Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793, n. 10; recounting numerous studies. See
Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 182–84; reviewing federal appellate criminal
decisions that considered harmless error between 1996 and 1998 and finding, “[i]n 87
percent of the cases, the errors were held to be harmless,” ibid., 184; Solomon, “Causing
Constitutional Harm,” 1065–67, 1067 n.64; reviewing published federal appellate habeas
corpus decisions that conducted harmless error review between 1993 and 2004 and
finding errors harmless in “nearly two out of three analyses,” ibid., 1067; Goldberg,
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 421; estimating, based on citations to the 1967 Chapman
decision, that, as of 1980, harmless error had “determined as many cases as almost any
precedent,” ibid., n. 2; but see Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1180–81 & nn. 50, 52;
reviewing published federal appellate decisions (including civil cases) and finding that
about 2% mentioned “harmless error” between 1969 and 1985 and about 1.58%
mentioned it between 1986 and 1994, whereas about 0.79% mentioned it pre-Chapman.
Review of harmless error at the state level also revealed significant, impactful influence
on appellate judgments. See Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 62–72; reviewing one
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involves appellate courts weighing the evidence for factual guilt, rather than legally
determining whether the government proved that the error could not have affected the
defendant’s substantial rights. 496 The warning given after the harmless error doctrine’s
creation has now become a reality: the “judicial pendulum” has swung “to presuming all
errors to be 'harmless'” when appellate courts believe that the defendant complaining of
the constitutional violation is, in fact, guilty. But, “[i]n view of the place of importance
that trial by jury has in our Bill of Rights,” harmless error review should not “substitute
the belief of appellate judges in the guilt of an accused, however, justifiably engendered
by the dead record, for ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial
guidance, however cumbersome that process may be.” 497 The harmless error doctrine’s

state’s death penalty decisions between 1976 and 1996 and finding that, during this
period, “the reversal rate … dropped from 94% to 14%,” ibid., 62, and “differential use
of the harmless error doctrine” accounted for “nearly all of the difference in death penalty
outcomes,” ibid., 63; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 504 n. 26; finding, based on
review of one state court’s death penalty decisions in 1995 and 1996, that in 72% of the
cases, “at least one claimed error was resolved by applying the harmless error rule;”
Thomas Y. Davies, “Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making
Norms in a California Court of Appeal,” American Bar Foundation Research Journal 7,
no. 3 (1982); finding that in fiscal year 1974, criminal appellate dispositions in one state
court reflected “at least one harmless error reference in approximately a quarter of all
affirmed and modified appeals,” ibid, 604, and that “[i]ssues where . . . the harmless error
rule . . . [was] likely to apply had very low success rates,” ibid., 617.
496
See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1171-72; “I believe that, more often than not, we
[judges] review the record to determine how we might have decided the case; the
judgment as to whether an error is harmless is therefore dependent on our judgment about
factual guilt of the defendant.” Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,”
1361; while Chapman focuses on the nature and context of the error, Harrington directs
attention away from the error to the rest of the evidence; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 80; the Court has extend[ed] its preoccupation with
factual guilt beyond rhetoric.”
497
Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15. (Emphasis supplied). See also Kotteakos, 320 U.S. at
760; “our government is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake,
with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic [sic] individual protections,
including those surrounding criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or
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interests of pragmatism, efficiency, and finality have, impermissibly, allowed courts to
invade the role of the jury and erode fundamental individual rights and institutional
democratic protections. 498
The courts’ continued use of the harmless error doctrine also allows, even
encourages, unlawfulness and abuse by the very governmental branches charged with
enforcing the law. 499 The Constitution’s protections against governmental abuse and
majoritarian rule, and its protections of the larger values enshrined within constitutional
rights, are placed in jeopardy, as a result. The courts should, instead, seek to uphold the
law and Constitution and deter government officials from violating them. As Justice
Brandeis stated in dissent to a case that the Court later overturned, 500 the Constitution
limits the power and authority of federal actors and precludes them from taking
advantage of constitutional violations, even to obtain convictions. 501 The courts, in turn,

complacent ….;” Bihn, 328 U.S at 638-39; “[n]or is it enough for us to conclude that guilt
may be deduced from the whole record. Such a course would lead to serious intrusions on
the historic [sic] functions of the jury under our system of government;” Chapman, 386
U.S. at 22; rejecting an “overwhelming evidence” of guilt test and stating that the purpose
of the harmless error doctrine is “to block setting aside convictions for small errors or
defects.” Compare Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64, and Epps, “Harmless
Errors,” 2128; both noting that Congress rejected a “correct result was reached” approach
and, instead, focused on whether the error affected substantial rights when creating the
harmless error statute.
498
Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 455-56; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2027, 206065.
499
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 515-16; See also Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom
Misconduct,” 470; “Courts themselves are instruments of law enforcement.”
500
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 482, 48 S.Ct. 564, 574, 72 L. Ed. 944
(1928), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed.
2d 1040 (1967), and overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct.
507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
501
Ibid., 484; “The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as his most virtuous
fellow citizen.”
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must deny federal actors the benefit of their violations in order to protect and promote
constitutional values, respect for the law, and public confidence in the justice system: 502
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration
of the criminal law the end justifies the means – to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal – would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this court should resolutely set its face. 503
But the courts have not always done so, as illustrated by the “hypothetical”
outlined in Chapter 1, which is a slightly-altered version of a real case, as well as
numerous other cases. 504 Kirk Defendant is actually Karl Fontenot, the well-publicized

502

Ibid.
Ibid., 485. (Emphasis supplied). See also Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom
Misconduct,” 457; “Society and the courts have a significant interest in promoting
confidence in the administration of justice, and in preserving the judicial process from
contamination by courses of action found illegal or deemed unfair.”
504
See e.g., Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” xi, xxiv-xxv; citing the 2013 release of a
death row inmate convicted based on a supposed oral confession that was fabricated by
Detective Saldate, “a serial liar,” and the prosecution’s withholding, for decades, of
exculpatory Brady evidence; ibid., xxvi; another case involving a serial jailhouse snitch
that the prosecutor knew to be a liar, but routinely placed near target defendants’ jail cells
503
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subject of books, articles, and television series that dub him “the innocent man.” 505 On
appeal, the court affirmed Fontenot’s conviction. 506 It rejected his challenge to his
confession, despite his claims of coercion and the stark differences between his
confession and the actual circumstances of the victim’s death. It refused his arguments
that the police fed the suspects the same information for the confessions – information
that turned out to be incorrect – or that Fontenot’s mental deficiencies or psychological
state rendered his confession untrustworthy. Finally, the court approved of the detective’s
testimony about the co-defendant’s confession during Fontenot’s trial, despite the earlier
court order that the confession could not be used and was unreliable in regard to him. 507
Karl Fontenot has now been in prison for 35 years. The defendants in the second
murder case, in which the same jailhouse informant falsely claimed the two men had
confessed, have since been exonerated by DNA evidence. 508 The parallels between the

anyway; ibid, xxvii; prosecution withheld the statements of seventeen witnesses, all of
whom said they saw the victim alive after the defendant was arrested and incarcerated for
murder.
505
See John Grisham, The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town (New
York: Random House, 2006): 430; condemning a system that condones “bad police work,
junk science, faulty eyewitness identifications, bad defense lawyers, lazy prosecutors,
[and] arrogant prosecutors;” Robert Mayer, The Dreams of Ada (New York: Broadway
Books, 2006): jacket; recounting “the nightmare of a small town obsessed with delivering
justice, and the bizarre dream of a poor, uneducated man accused of murder – a case that
chillingly parallels [another] one, occurring in the very same town;” Nick Schager, “‘The
Innocent Man’: Inside the Two Gruesome Murders Haunting a Small Oklahoma Town,”
The Daily Beast, December 10, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-innocent-maninside-the-two-gruesome-murders-haunting-a-small-oklahoma-town; The Innocent Man,
directed by Clay Tweel, (Los Gatos, CA: Netflix, Inc., 2018), television.
506
Fontenot v. State of Oklahoma, 992 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). See Fontenot v.
State of Oklahoma, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); giving additional facts.
507
Ibid.
508
Innocence Project, “Ron Williamson,” The Innocence Project, accessed February 13,
2019, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/ron-williamson. Williamson and his codefendant, Dennis Fritz, were exonerated in 1999 after serving eleven years in prison for
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two murder cases are too obvious to miss: both had “minimal physical evidence, the use
of ‘dream’ confessions, [] reliance on testimony by [the same] jailhouse informant[],
[and] … a similar cast of characters: Peterson was the prosecutor and Rogers was the
investigator.” 509 Unfortunately, for Fontenot and his co-defendant, DNA evidence no
longer exists in their case.
In early 2019, Fontenot’s counsel learned that voluminous, undisclosed police
records exist that document the police investigations, interrogations, intimidation of
witnesses, and interception of Fontenot’s attorney letters, as were noted in the case
sketch. 510 But, the records also contain many other, undisclosed witness statements
saying that the victim had long been stalked by an unknown assailant; that Fontenot was
not one of the men at the convenience store; and that Fontenot was at the party the entire

a crime they did not commit. Williamson was only five days away from execution when
the court issued a stay. As the record demonstrates, the State fought the defendants’
attempts to prove their innocence at every turn. See Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991), order corrected by, 905 P.2d 1135 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992), rehearing denied, 504 U.S. 968 (1992). See also
Williamson v. State, 852 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115
(1994). And see Williamson v. State, 904 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), affirmed, 110
F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997). See Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991),
affirmed, 64 F.3d 338 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997).
509
Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 726 (10th Cir. 2010). In this civil suit, State
Prosecutor William Peterson, Police Officer Gary Rogers, and State forensic hair expert
Melvin Hett sued the book authors for, inter alia, defamation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of their suit. After noting that “[t]he books themselves are
substantially true,” the district court “faced … th[e] basic question: What two words best
describe a claim for money damages by government officials against authors and
publishers of books describing purported prosecutorial misconduct? Answer: Not
plausible.” Peterson v. Grisham, No. CIV-07-317-RAW, 2008 WL 4363653, at *1, *6
(E.D.Ok., Sept. 17, 2008).
510
See supra Chapter 1, pp. 4-6.
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night of the crimes. 511 Fontenot’s attorneys are, again, challenging his conviction. They
have lodged claims of prosecutor and police misconduct, which include Brady
nondisclosures, Fifth Amendment violations of the rights against self-incrimination and
deprivation of due process, and Sixth Amendment violations of the rights to compel and
confront witnesses and to assistance of counsel. 512 Whether Fontenot’s claims succeed
likely will depend on the importance the reviewing court places on constitutional rights
and its interpretation of harmless constitutional error. It is this author’s hope that the
dialogue will be something like one described by a judge who clearly places
constitutional values and trial fairness above pragmatic harmless error concerns of
efficiency and finality. That fine judge stated:
While considering my decision in this case I told a friend, a layman, I
believed the facts and law dictated that I must grant a new trial to a
defendant who had been convicted and sentenced to death.
My friend asked, “Is he a murderer?”
I replied simply, “We won't know until he receives a fair trial.”
God help us, if ever in this great country we turn our heads while people
who have not had fair trials are executed. That almost happened in this
case. 513

511

See Fontenot v. Allbaugh, case number 6:16-cv-00069, doc. number 123 (E.D.Ok.,
March 19, 2019).
512
Ibid.
513
Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1576–77 (Seay, J.).
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